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Abstract
This paper explores theoretical implications of the e¢ cient structure and
quiet-life hypotheses on the basis of the generalized user-revenue model con-
structed by Homma (2009, 2012). From the perspective of the extended
generalized-Lerner index (EGLI) on the cost frontier, the following two points
are noteworthy: 1) it is not always possible to justify anti-monopoly and anti-
concentration policies using support for the quiet-life hypothesis; and 2) new
industrial organization policies are required if support for the e¢ cient struc-
ture hypothesis is undesirable. Furthermore, where intertemporal regular
linkage of single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier exists, the appropriate
industrial organization policies must be determined based on a long-term
perspective. If this linkage shows an upward trend caused mainly by an up-
wardly trending intertemporal regular linkage of single-period Herndahl in-
dices, then anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies are justied from a
long-term perspective. If the upward trend of the intertemporal regular link-
age of single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier is, however, caused mainly
by the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period dynamic cost e¢ cien-
cies or single-period optimal planned nancial goods, then other policies are
desirable because in this case anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies
cause unnecessary distortion in the economy.
Keywords: E¢ cient structure hypothesis; Quiet-life hypothesis; Generalized
user-revenue model; Extended generalized-Lerner index; Cost frontier; Dy-
namic cost e¢ ciency; Intertemporal regular linkage
JEL classication: C61; D24; G21; L13
1 Introduction
On the basis of the generalized user-revenue model (hereafter the GURM)
constructed by Homma (2009, 2012), we explore theoretical implications
of the e¢ cient structure hypothesis proposed by Demsetz (1973) and the
quiet-life hypothesis rst put forward by Berger and Hannan (1998). We
develop mathematical formulations and subsequent interpretations covering
the relative magnitude of both hypotheses, the relation between both hy-
potheses and the extended generalized Lerner index (hereafter the EGLI)
on the cost frontier proposed by Homma (2009, 2012), and the relation be-
tween both hypotheses and the existence of intertemporal regular linkages of
single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, single-period optimal planned nan-
cial goods, single-period Herndahl indices, and single-period EGLIs on the
cost frontier.
The rst step in considering the theoretical implications of both hypothe-
ses requires formulating them in mathematical terms; this is accomplished
in Sections 2 and 3. Thus far, in the extant literature, formulations of these
hypotheses have only been attempted in empirical contexts (e.g., Berger and
Hannan 1998 and Homma et al. 2014). Consequently, they have been ver-
iable but lack theoretical depth because dynamic-uncertainty banking be-
havior has not been explicitly formulated under imperfect competition. This
paper formulates both hypotheses on the basis of the GURM elaborated by
Homma (2009, 2012). The GURM was developed from Hancocks (1985,
1987, 1991) user-cost model (hereafter UCM) of nancial rms. Specically,
the GURM is a more general model that relaxes the following ve implicit
assumptions of the UCM. First, nancial rms are risk neutral. Second, no
strategic interdependence exists between nancial rms. Third, no asym-
metric information exists in the market for nancial assets and liabilities.
Fourth, no uncertainty exists in holding revenues and costs. Fifth, the utility
function of nancial rms does not depend on equity capital. Furthermore, in
order to formulate both hypotheses, this paper develops the GURM in terms
of relaxing the sixth implicit assumption of the UCM that no cost ine¢ ciency
exists in nancial rms (i.e., nancial rms are perfectly cost e¢ cient).
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Following the mathematical formulation of both hypotheses, Section 3 of-
fers theoretical interpretations based on these elaborations. Demsetzs (1973)
e¢ cient structure hypothesis proposes that under the pressure of market com-
petition, e¢ cient rms prevail and grow, so that they become larger, capture
greater market shares, and accrue higher prots. Under this hypothesis, a
market becomes more e¢ cient as a result of market concentration, thus anti-
monopoly and anti-concentration policies cause unnecessary strain in the
economy. Signicantly, from the perspective of industrial organization, this
hypothesis is a composite that suggests three stages of causal relations from
rm e¢ ciency to rm growth (i.e., the rst stage), then to market structure
(i.e., the second stage), and nally to market performance (i.e., the third
stage).
Demsetz (1973) equated market structure to market share, whilst market
performance was considered in terms of rmsprots. From the perspec-
tive of contemporary industrial organization, however, it is more desirable to
regard market structure as the Herndahl index that accounts for the distri-
bution of a nancial good, rather than using a simple market share proxy.
In addition, market performance could be better captured by accounting for
the degree of market competition (i.e., the Lerner index) rather than just
considering individual rmsprots. Thus, there is scope for improving on
how Demsetzs (1973) original ideas about the two stages of causal relations
from rm growth to market structure (i.e., the second stage) and to market
performance (i.e., the third stage) are operationalized. By contrast, there is
no such need to reconsider Demsetzs (1973) approach in terms of the rst
stage causality from rm e¢ ciency to rm growth. As noted by Homma et
al. (2014), this rst stage causality is the fundamental feature of the e¢ cient
structure hypothesis, so this paper also regards this causality as the e¢ cient
structure hypothesis. Specically, by regarding rm e¢ ciency as dynamic
cost e¢ ciency, and by considering rm growth as an increase in a nancial
good (e.g., a loan), this paper endeavors to theoretically interpret the e¢ -
cient structure hypothesis on the basis of the mathematical formulations put
forward in the rst step. As will be seen, not only the original interpretation
of Demsetz (1973) but also a more advanced interpretation of the e¢ cient
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structure hypothesis is possible.
Moving on, according to Berger and Hannan (1998), the quiet-life hy-
pothesis suggests that in a concentrated market, rms do not minimize costs
for various reasons including insu¢ cient managerial e¤ort, lack of prot-
maximizing behavior, wasteful expenditures to obtain and maintain monopoly
power, and/or survival of ine¢ cient managers. Consequently, increases in
market concentration will decrease rm e¢ ciency, thus justifying anti-monopoly
and anti-concentration policies. Similar to Homma et al. (2014), by regard-
ing the relationship between market concentration and rm e¢ ciency as that
between the Herndahl index and dynamic cost e¢ ciency, this paper seeks
to theoretically interpret the quiet-life hypothesis on the basis of the math-
ematical formulations in the rst step. Doing so suggests that not only the
original interpretation of Berger and Hannan (1998) but also a more advanced
interpretation of the quiet-life hypothesis is possible.
The third step involves theoretically clarifying the relative magnitude
of the e¢ cient structure hypothesis to the quiet-life hypothesis; this is ap-
proached in Section 4. Where support for both hypotheses decreases market
performance (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost frontier) and if the
quiet-life hypothesis is superior in magnitude to the e¢ cient structure hy-
pothesis, then anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies are necessary.
If the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is, however, superior in magnitude to
the quiet-life hypothesis, then new industrial organization policies which dif-
fer from existing anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies, and under
which e¢ ciency improvements would increase the degree of competition on
the cost frontier, are needed. Consequently, it is important to clarify which
of these two hypotheses is superior, because the necessary industrial organi-
zation policy interventions depend on this.
The fourth step involves identifying and exploring the relation between
both hypotheses and the EGLI on the cost frontier; this is covered in Section
5. According to Homma (2009, 2012), the EGLI is useful because it accounts
for not only the e¤ect of market structure and conduct but also the e¤ect
of nancial rmsrisk attitudes, the e¤ect of uctuation risk on short-run
prots, and the e¤ect of equity capital on the risk of burden from nancial
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distress costs. This paper develops the EGLI in terms of explicitly accounting
for dynamic cost e¢ ciency, to clarify the theoretical relation between both
hypotheses and the EGLI. Beyond theory, this development is desirable from
a normative policy perspective because it facilitates evaluation by the stan-
dard of a frontier bank (i.e., the most cost-e¢ cient bank). On the basis of this
development, this paper theoretically claries under what assumptions either
or both of the hypotheses increase or decrease the EGLI on the cost frontier
and thus whether either or both of the hypotheses are desirable. Indeed, the
results of the theoretical analysis conducted herein suggest that both desir-
able and undesirable cases exist, and the following two points are particularly
noteworthy: (1) it is not always possible to use support for the quiet-life hy-
pothesis to justify anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies; and (2) new
industrial organization policies are needed if support for the e¢ cient struc-
ture hypothesis is undesirable. In terms of the rst point, support for the
quiet-life hypothesis can decrease the EGLI on the cost frontier (i.e., increase
the degree of competition on the cost frontier), and hence where this occurs
it cannot always be used to justify anti-monopoly and anti-concentration
policies, even if an increase in market concentration decreases dynamic cost
e¢ ciency. Such policies are only justied where increased market concen-
tration increases the EGLI on the cost frontier (i.e., decreases the degree of
competition on the cost frontier). As such, the enactment and enforcement of
anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies requires careful consideration.
Regarding the second point, so far, a theoretical foundation for suggesting
that support for the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is undesirable is lacking.
However, at least theoretically, support for the e¢ cient structure hypothesis
can both decrease the EGLI on the cost frontier (i.e., increase the degree of
competition on the cost frontier) and increase the EGLI on the cost frontier
(i.e., decreases the degree of competition on the cost frontier). In terms of
the latter, it is determined that support for the e¢ cient structure hypothesis
is undesirable. In this case, new industrial organization policies which dif-
fer from existing anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies, and under
which e¢ ciency improvements would increase the degree of competition on
the cost frontier, are advised.
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The last step requires clarifying the relation between both hypotheses and
the intertemporal regular linkages (i.e., cyclical linkages, monotonic trending
linkages, and terminal up-and-down volatile linkages) of single-period dy-
namic cost e¢ ciencies, single-period optimal planned nancial goods, single-
period Herndahl indices, and single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier; this
is considered in Section 6. These linkages serve to permit long-term forecasts
and long-term dynamic analyses, so they are critical from the perspective of
industrial organization.
2 Extending the GURM to Explicitly Account
for Dynamic Cost E¢ ciency
To formulate both hypotheses, this section extends the GURM to explicitly
account for dynamic cost e¢ ciency. Specically, a dynamic cost function
is derived by employing the following two procedures, then dynamic cost
e¢ ciency is dened by using this dynamic cost function. First, a static
transformation function of three vectors and one variable is dened, namely,
a vector of real balances of nancial goods, a vector of real resource inputs, a
vector of exogenous (state) variables a¤ecting the quality of nancial goods,
and an index of (exogenous) technical change. Moreover, using this dened
function, a static cost function is derived from the vector of variable input
prices in addition to two vectors and one variable other than the vector of
real resource inputs in this dened function. Second, a dynamic transforma-
tion function is derived from the vector of Herndahl indices in the previous
period and static cost e¢ ciency in the previous period in addition to three
vectors and one variable in the static transformation function. The dynamic
cost function of these vectors and e¢ ciency in addition to three vectors and
one variable in the static cost function is, furthermore, derived. Next, af-
ter deriving the dynamic cost function and dening dynamic cost e¢ ciency,
quasi-short-run prots are redened using the derived dynamic cost function.
The dynamic-uncertainty behavior of nancial rms is then reformulated to
explicitly account for the e¤ects of the Herndahl indices in the previous
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period and static cost e¢ ciency in the previous period. Furthermore, on the
basis of this formulation, stochastic Euler equations are derived, and gener-
alized user-revenue prices (hereafter the GURPs) and EGLIs are redened
by transforming these equations.
The following preliminary assumptions are made. First, time is divided
into discrete periods. Second, these periods are su¢ ciently short that vari-
ations in exogenous (state) variables within the period can be neglected. In
other words, exogenous variables are constant within each period but can
change discretely at the boundaries between periods. Third, the process of
adjustment is essentially instantaneous, allowing stock adjustment problems
to be ignored. These assumptions are made to facilitate empirical research, in
a manner similar to that of Hancock (1985, 1987, 1991), Homma and Souma
(2005), and Homma (2009, 2012), with the expectation that the GURM may
provide a consistent basis for such research.
2.1 Dynamic Cost E¢ ciency and Dynamic Marginal
Variable Costs
2.1.1 Static E¢ cient Production Technology (Static Transforma-
tion Function)
In order to derive and dene the static cost function as a precursor to dening
usual static cost e¢ ciency, static e¢ cient production technology is dened
as follows.
Denition 1 (Static E¢ cient Production Technology) The static ef-
cient production technology of the i-th nancial rm in period t is repre-
sented by the following static transformation function:
Si

qi;t;xi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

= 0; (t  0) ; (2.1.1)
where qi;t = (qi;1;t;   ; qi;NA+NL;t)0 is a vector of real balances of nancial
goods, namely nancial assets (i.e., qi;1;t;   ; qi;NA;t) and liabilities (i.e.,
qi;NA+1;t; ; qi;NA+NL;t), xi;t = (xi;1;t;   ; xi;M;t)0 is a vector of real resource in-
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puts, namely labor, materials, and physical capital, zQi;t =

zQ0i;1;t;   ; zQ0i;NA+NL;t
0
is a vector of exogenous (state) variables a¤ecting the quality of nancial
goods, namely, nancial technological factors that a¤ect nancial goods and
real resource inputs, and  i;t is an index of (exogenous) technical change.
Similar to the conventional transformation function, this static transfor-
mation function has the following two properties. First, some elements of the
real balance vector qi;t may be outputs or inputs, but not all can be inputs,
as the existence of outputs cannot otherwise be guaranteed. Second, the
static transformation function Si satises appropriate regularity conditions.
That is, Si is strictly convex in (qi;t;xi;t) and @
S
i /@qi;j;t > 0 if qi;j;t is an
output, @Si /@qi;j;t < 0 if qi;j;t is an input, and @
S
i /@xi;j;t < 0, because xi;t
is an input vector.
2.1.2 Static Frontier Variable Cost Function
Next, to derive and dene the static frontier cost function required for den-
ing usual static cost e¢ ciency, real resource inputs are assumed to be opti-
mized within a single period, taking nancial goods (i.e., outputs and xed
inputs) as given. Specically, for a single period, it is assumed that the nan-
cial rm takes the vector of input prices pi;t = (pi;1;t;   ; pi;M;t)0 as given and
minimizes real resource variable costs
XM
j=1
pi;j;t  xi;j;t with respect to the
vector of real resource inputs xi;t subject to the static transformation func-
tion Si given by Eq. (2.1.1). Under this assumption, the following static
frontier variable cost function is derived and dened.
Denition 2 (Static Frontier Variable Cost Function) The static fron-
tier variable cost function of the i-th nancial rm in period t, denoted by
CSFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

, is given by
CSFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

= min
xi;t
nXM
j=1
pi;j;t  xi;j;t
Si qi;t;xi;t; zQi;t;  i;t = 0o ; (t  0) : (2.1.2)
7
From the rst property of the static transformation function, some ele-
ments of the real balance vector qi;t may be outputs or inputs, but not all
can be inputs, so some elements of qi;t in the static frontier variable cost
function may be outputs or xed inputs, but not all can be xed inputs.
In order to explicitly account for this property, let qOi;t =
 
qOi;1;t;   ; qOi;NO;t
0
denote the output vector of real balances of the i-th nancial rm in period
t, and let qFi;t =
 
qFi;1;t;   ; qFi;NF ;t
0
be the xed input vector. Both vectors
include all elements of qi;t.1 In this case, similar to the conventional variable
cost function, because of the duality between transformation functions and
variable cost functions, this static frontier variable cost function CSFVi also
has the following properties: it is strictly increasing in pi;t and qOi;t, strictly
decreasing in qFi;t, homogeneous of degree one, and strictly concave in pi;t.
2.1.3 Static Actual Variable Cost Function
On the basis of the derived and dened static frontier variable cost function,
the static actual variable cost function required to dene usual static cost
e¢ ciency is dened as follows.
Denition 3 (Static Actual Variable Cost Function) The static actual
variable cost function of the i-th nancial rm in period t, denoted by
CSAVi

aSIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

, is given by
CSAVi

aSIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

=
XM
j=1
pi;j;t  aSIEi;j;t 
@CSFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

@pi;j;t
=
XM
j=1
pi;j;t  aSIEi;j;t  xSFDi;j

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

 CSFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

; (t  0) ;
(2.1.3.1)
where aSIEi;t =
 
aSIEi;1;t ;   ; aSIEi;M;t
0
is a vector of ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of static
factor demand functions denoted by xSFDi;j

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

1In this case, qt =
 
qO0t ;q
F 0
t
0
and NO +NF = NA +NL are satised.
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(= @CSFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t
.
@pi;j;t, j = 1; :::;M). Some elements of this
vector aSIEi;t may be less than, equal to, or greater than one, but not all can
be less than one, as the static actual variable cost function is otherwise less
than the static frontier variable cost function.
From the duality between the static transformation function and the sta-
tic frontier cost function, the following equations hold:
xSFDi;j

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

=
@CSFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

@pi;j;t
; (j = 1; :::;M) :
(2.1.3.2)
From these equations, the j-th static factor demand function,
xSFDi;j

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

, means the j-th optimal input for cost minimization,
so the product of this static factor demand function and the ine¢ ciency coef-
cient, aSIEi;j;t xSFDi;j

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

, is the j-th actual input that explicitly
accounts for input ine¢ ciency because the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient aSIEi;j;t does
not necessarily equal one. The product of this actual input and the j-th
factor price is the j-th actual input cost, so the sum of all actual input costs
is the actual total cost (i.e., the static actual variable cost function) that is
not less than the minimum total cost (i.e., the static frontier variable cost
function). From the denition of the static actual variable cost function
(Denition 3), this variable cost function also exhibits properties similar to
the static frontier variable cost function. That is, the static actual variable
cost function CSAVi is strictly increasing in pi;t and q
O
i;t, strictly decreasing
in qFi;t, homogeneous of degree one, and strictly concave in pi;t. Further-
more, if all the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of factor demand functions equal aSIEi;t
(i.e., aSIEi;t = a
SIE
i;j;t  1, j = 1; :::;M), the following equation holds, so the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient aSIEi;t has a cost neutral property:
CSAVi

aSIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

= aSIEi;t  CSFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

: (2.1.3.3)
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2.1.4 Static Cost E¢ ciency
On the basis of the derived and dened static frontier and actual variable
cost functions, static cost e¢ ciency is dened as follows.
Denition 4 (Static Cost E¢ ciency) The static cost e¢ ciency of the i-
th nancial rm in period t, denoted by EF Si;t, is given by
EF Si;t =
CSFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

CSAVi

aSIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t
 ; (t  0) : (2.1.4)
From this denition and the denition of the static actual variable cost
function (Denition 3), static cost e¢ ciency EF Si;t is not greater than one (i.e.,
EF Si;t  1), and, if all the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of factor demand functions
equal aSIEi;t (i.e., a
SIE
i;t = a
SIE
i;j;t  1, j = 1; :::;M), EF Si;t is the inverse of the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient aSIEi;t (i.e., EF
S
i;t = 1

aSIEi;t ).
2.1.5 Static Neutral Cost E¢ ciency
From the perspective of empirical feasibility, it is useful to account for a
specication where all ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of factor demand functions are
equal, because most empirical models that estimate cost e¢ ciency assume a
cost neutral ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. Consequently, also from the perspective
of empirical analyses, consideration of this case is important for illuminating
the theoretical foundation of many extant empirical models.
The following three points are assumed in addition to the cost neutral inef-
ciency coe¢ cient. First, the static frontier variable cost function is identical
for all nancial rms. Second, the component other than the cost neutral in-
e¢ ciency coe¢ cient of the static frontier and actual variable cost functions is
identical for all nancial rms. Third, the cost neutral ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient
is an exponential function of an individual function of an index of (exogenous)
technical change. The reasons for this third assumption are that static cost
e¢ ciency, dened later, exhibits a time-variant property and many existing
cost functions take a logarithmic form. Under these three assumptions, the
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static actual variable cost function can be specied as follows:
CSAVi

aSIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

= exp

aSi ( i;t)
	Csf pi;t;qi;t; zQi;t;  i;t ; (t  0) ;
(2.1.5.1)
where the coe¢ cient exp

aSi ( i;t)
	
is the cost neutral ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient
aSIEi;t (i.e., a
SIE
i;t = exp

aSi ( i;t)
	
), and the function Csf

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

is common to all nancial rms. Similarly, the static frontier variable cost
function can be specied as follows:
CSFV

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

= exp
n
min
i
aSi ( i;t)
o
Csf

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

; (t  0) ;
(2.1.5.2)
where the logarithm of the cost neutral ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient mini aSi ( i;t)
is the minimum of the logarithms of the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients aSi ( i;t)
(i = 1; :::; NF ) for all nancial rms. This specication enables the static
frontier variable cost function to always be no greater than the static actual
variable cost function. On the basis of these specications, static neutral cost
e¢ ciency can be specied as follows:
EF Si;t = C
SFV

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t
.
CSAVi

aSIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

= exp
hn
min
i
aSi ( i;t)
o
  aSi ( i;t)
i
; (t  0) : (2.1.5.3)
Accordingly, static neutral cost e¢ ciency is time variant and can be specied
only by the cost neutral ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients. In practical terms, static
neutral cost e¢ ciency can be easily estimated by specifying these ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cients as the time-variant coe¢ cients of individual dummies of nancial
rms.
2.1.6 Dynamic E¢ cient Production Technology (Dynamic Trans-
formation Function)
If we regard the economic behavior of nancial rms as static within a single
period, it is valid to also regard the e¢ cient production technology as being
static. However, for intertemporal dynamic behavior, it is desirable to also
account for the possibility that the e¢ cient production technology is also
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dynamic. To explicitly account for both the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life
hypotheses, the e¢ cient production technology needs to be formulated to
dynamically account for the e¤ects of the Herndahl indices in the previous
period and static cost e¢ ciency in the previous period. Accordingly, dynamic
e¢ cient production technology is dened as the following function of a vector
of Herndahl indices in the previous period and static cost e¢ ciency in the
previous period in addition to three vectors and one variable in the static
transformation function.
Denition 5 (Dynamic E¢ cient Production Technology) The dynamic
e¢ cient production technology of the i-th nancial rm in period t is repre-
sented by the following dynamic transformation function:
Di

qi;t;xi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

= 0; (t  0) ; (2.1.6)
where b1 is a parameter used to distinguish between the initial period and the
later period: b1 = 0 for the initial period (i.e., t = 0), and b1 = 1 for the
later period (i.e., t  1). In addition, HIt 1 = (HI1;t 1; :::; HINA+NL;t 1)0
is a vector of Herndahl indices in the previous period, EF Si;t 1 is static cost
e¢ ciency in the previous period, and all others are as per the static trans-
formation function.
From this denition, for the initial period, the dynamic transformation
function equals the static transformation function, and, for the later period,
they di¤er. Because static cost e¢ ciency is included in the previous period
as a variable, the dynamic transformation function in the current period is
premised on the existence of the static transformation function in the previ-
ous period. Therefore, for all periods including the initial period, provided
that the static transformation function exists, the dynamic transformation
function can also exist. To the extent that Herndahl indices in the previous
period and static cost e¢ ciency in the previous period a¤ect the transforma-
tion function in the current period, the coexistence of both transformation
functions continues; this provides the production-technological foundation for
simultaneous support of both the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypothe-
ses. The properties of the dynamic transformation function with respect to
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the element of the vector of real balances of nancial goods and the element
of the vector of real resource inputs are similar to the static transformation
function.
2.1.7 Dynamic Frontier Variable Cost Function
Next, the following dynamic frontier variable cost function is derived and
dened as a precursor to dening dynamic cost e¢ ciency.
Denition 6 (Dynamic Frontier Variable Cost Function) The dynamic
frontier variable cost function of the i-th nancial rm in period t, denoted
by CDFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

, is given by
CDFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

= min
xi;t
nXM
j=1
pi;j;t  xi;j;t
Di qi;t;xi;t; zQi;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t = 0o ;
(t  0) ; (2.1.7)
where three vectors and a variable other than the vector of Herndahl indices
in the previous period and static cost e¢ ciency in the previous period are
similar to the static frontier variable cost function.
From this denition, similar to the relation between static and dynamic
transformation functions, for the initial period, the dynamic frontier vari-
able cost function equals the static frontier variable cost function, and, for
the later period, they di¤er. The coexistence of both frontier variable cost
functions due to the coexistence of both transformation functions (on which
both frontier variable cost functions are based) yields the di¤erence to the
frontier criterion used for dening cost e¢ ciency. To explicitly account for
the possibility of simultaneous support for both the e¢ cient structure and
quiet-life hypotheses, static cost e¢ ciency regarding the static frontier vari-
able cost function and dynamic cost e¢ ciency (dened later) regarding the
dynamic frontier variable cost function are required to coexist. Properties
of the dynamic frontier variable cost function with respect to the element of
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the vector of real balances of nancial goods and the element of the vector of
real resource input prices are also similar to the static frontier variable cost
function.
2.1.8 Dynamic Actual Variable Cost Function
On the basis of the derived and dened dynamic frontier variable cost func-
tion, the dynamic actual variable cost function is dened as follows as a
precursor to dening dynamic cost e¢ ciency.
Denition 7 (Dynamic Actual Variable Cost Function) The dynamic
actual variable cost function of the i-th nancial rm in period t, denoted by
CDAVi

aDIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

, is given by
CDAVi

aDIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

=
XM
j=1
pi;j;t  aDIEi;j;t 
@CDFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

@pi;j;t
=
XM
j=1
pi;j;t  aDIEi;j;t  xDFDi;j

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

 CDFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

; (t  0) ; (2.1.8.1)
where aDIEi;t =
 
aDIEi;1;t ;   ; aDIEi;M;t
0
is the vector of ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of
dynamic factor demand functions denoted by
xDFDi;j

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

(= @CDFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t
.
@pi;j;t; j = 1; :::;M; ):
Some elements of this vector aDIEi;t may be less than, equal to, or greater than
one, but not all can be less than one, as otherwise the dynamic actual variable
cost function would be less than the dynamic frontier variable cost function.
Similar to the static case, from the duality between the dynamic transfor-
mation function and the dynamic frontier cost function, the following equa-
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tions hold:
xDFDi;j

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

=
@CDFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

@pi;j;t
; (j = 1; :::;M) :
(2.1.8.2)
From these equations, the j-th dynamic factor demand function,
xDFDi;j

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

, means the j-th optimal input
for cost minimization on the basis of dynamic e¢ cient production technol-
ogy, so the product of this dynamic factor demand function and the dynamic
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient, aDIEi;j;t xDFDi;j

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

,
is the j-th actual dynamic input that explicitly accounts for input dynamic
ine¢ ciency because the dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient aDIEi;j;t does not nec-
essarily equal one. The product of this actual dynamic input and the j-th
factor price is the j-th actual dynamic input cost, so the sum of all actual
dynamic input costs is the actual dynamic total cost (i.e., the dynamic actual
variable cost function) that is not less than the minimum dynamic total cost
(i.e., the dynamic frontier variable cost function). From this denition of
the dynamic actual variable cost function (Denition 7), this variable cost
function also has properties similar to the dynamic frontier variable cost
function. Furthermore, if all the dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of dynamic
factor demand functions equal aDIEi;t (i.e., a
DIE
i;t = a
DIE
i;j;t  1, j = 1; :::;M),
similar to the cost neutral ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient aSIEi;t , the following equation
holds so that the dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient aDIEi;t also has a cost neutral
property:
CDAVi

aDIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

= aDIEi;t  CDFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

: (2.1.8.3)
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2.1.9 Dynamic Cost E¢ ciency
On the basis of the derived and dened dynamic frontier and actual variable
cost functions, similar to the denition of static cost e¢ ciency, dynamic cost
e¢ ciency is dened as follows.
Denition 8 (Dynamic Cost E¢ ciency) The dynamic cost e¢ ciency of
the i-th nancial rm in period t, denoted by EFDi;t, is given by
EFDi;t =
CDFVi

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

CDAVi

aDIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t
 ; (t  0) :
(2.1.9)
From this denition and the denition of the dynamic actual variable
cost function (Denition 7), similar to the denition of static cost e¢ ciency,
dynamic cost e¢ ciency EFDi;t is also not greater than one (i.e., EF
D
i;t  1),
and, in the case that all the dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of dynamic
factor demand functions equal aDIEi;t (i.e., a
DIE
i;t = a
DIE
i;j;t  1, j = 1; :::;M),
EFDi;t is the inverse of the dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient a
DIE
i;t (i.e., EF
D
i;t =
1

aDIEi;t ).
2.1.10 Dynamic Neutral Cost E¢ ciency
For the dynamic case, the following assumption should be noted. For the later
period, rather than the initial period, the cost neutral dynamic ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient is a function of not only the index of (exogenous) technical change
but also the vector of Herndahl indices in the previous period and static cost
e¢ ciency in the previous period. The purpose of this additional assumption
is for dynamic cost e¢ ciency to not only be time-variant but also depend on
market structure in the previous period and cost e¢ ciency in the previous
period, and thereby to explicitly account for the possibility of simultaneous
support for both the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses. Under these
assumptions, the dynamic actual variable cost function can be specied as
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follows:
CDAVi

aDIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

= exp

aDi
 
b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t
	  Cdf pi;t;qi;t; zQi;t;  i;t ;
(t  0) ; (2.1.10.1)
where the coe¢ cient exp

aDi
 
b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t
	
is the cost neutral
dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient aDIEi;t (i.e.;
aDIEi;t = exp

aDi
 
b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t
	
); and the function Cdf

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

is a common component for all
nancial rms. Similarly, the dynamic frontier variable cost function can be
specied as follows:
CDFV

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

= exp
n
min
i
aDi
 
b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t
o  Cdf pi;t;qi;t; zQi;t;  i;t ;
(t  0) ; (2.1.10.2)
where the logarithm of the cost neutral dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient
mini a
D
i
 
b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

is the minimum of the logarithms of these
dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients aDi
 
b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

(i = 1; :::; NF )
for all nancial rms. This specication forestalls the dynamic frontier vari-
able cost function from ever being greater than the dynamic actual variable
cost function. On the basis of these specications, dynamic neutral cost
e¢ ciency can be specied as follows:
EFDi;t =
CDFV

pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

CDAVi

aDIEi;t ;pi;t;qi;t; z
Q
i;t; b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

= exp
hn
min
i
aDi
 
b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t
o
 aDi
 
b1 HIt 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t

; (t  0) : (2.1.10.3)
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From this specication, similar to static neutral cost e¢ ciency, dynamic neu-
tral cost e¢ ciency can be specied only by the cost neutral dynamic in-
e¢ ciency coe¢ cients, is time-variant, and depends on market structure in
the previous period and cost e¢ ciency in the previous period. In practi-
cal estimations, dynamic neutral cost e¢ ciency can be easily estimated by
specifying these dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients as individual dummies of
nancial rms that are time variant and dependent on Herndahl indices in
the previous period and static cost e¢ ciency in the previous period.
2.1.11 Dynamic Frontier and Actual Marginal Variable Costs
Because the relation between the marginal cost of the dynamic frontier vari-
able cost function (hereafter the dynamic frontier marginal variable cost) and
the marginal cost of the dynamic actual variable cost function (hereafter the
dynamic actual marginal variable cost) is used in the mathematical formu-
lations of both the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses considered
later, this relation is claried by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Dynamic frontier marginal variable cost (i.e., @CDFVi;t

@qi;j;t)
is related to dynamic actual marginal variable cost (i.e., @CDAVi;t

@qi;j;t) as
follows:
@CDFVi;t
@qi;j;t
=
 
EFDi;t +
@EFDi;t
@ ln qi;j;t
,
@ lnCDAVi;t
@ ln qi;j;t
!
 @C
DAV
i;t
@qi;j;t
=
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @CDAVi;t@qi;j;t ; j = 1; :::; NA +NL,
(2.1.11.1)
where CDFVi;t is the dynamic frontier variable cost function, C
DAV
i;t is the dy-
namic actual variable cost function, qi;j;t is the real balance of the j-th nan-
cial good, and EFDi;t is dynamic cost e¢ ciency.
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Proof. From the denition of dynamic cost e¢ ciency, the following equation
holds:
EFDi;t =
CDFVi;t
CDAVi;t
:
Partially di¤erentiating both sides of this equation with respect to the real
balance of the j-th nancial good qi;j;t leads to the following expression:
@EFDi;t
@qi;j;t
=
1
CDAVi;t

 
@CDFVi;t
@qi;j;t
  EFDi;t 
@CDAVi;t
@qi;j;t
!
:
Transforming this equation with respect to dynamic frontier marginal vari-
able cost @CDFVi;t

@qi;j;t and rearranging yields
@CDFVi;t
@qi;j;t
= CDAVi;t 
@EFDi;t
@qi;j;t
+ EFDi;t 
@CDAVi;t
@qi;j;t
=
CDAVi;t
qi;j;t
 @EF
D
i;t
@ ln qi;j;t
+ EFDi;t 
@CDAVi;t
@qi;j;t
=
 
EFDi;t +
@EFDi;t
@ ln qi;j;t
,
@ lnCDAVi;t
@ ln qi;j;t
!
 @C
DAV
i;t
@qi;j;t
=
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @CDAVi;t@qi;j;t :
As noted, where the dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients are cost neutral,
dynamic cost e¢ ciency EFDi;t is the inverse of the cost neutral dynamic in-
e¢ ciency coe¢ cient aDIEi;t (i.e., EF
D
i;t = 1

aDIEi;t ). Therefore, the following
equation holds: 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 1
= CDAVi;t 
@EFDi;t
@CDAVi;t
= CDAVi;t 
@
 
aDIEi;t
 1
@CDAVi;t
= 0:
Consequently, the following equation is obtained:
@CDFVi;t
@qi;j;t
= EFDi;t 
@CDAVi;t
@qi;j;t
: (2.1.11.2)
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Based on its denition, dynamic cost e¢ ciency is not greater than one, so
dynamic frontier marginal variable cost is not greater than dynamic actual
marginal variable cost. Where the dynamic ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients are not
cost neutral, if the inverse of the elasticity of the dynamic actual variable
cost function with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency is not greater than
dynamic cost ine¢ ciency (i.e.,
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1  1 EFDi;t), then the
same relation between these two marginal variable costs holds. However, this
relation cannot otherwise be established.
2.2 GURM Based on Dynamic E¢ cient Production
Technology
In this subsection, the GURM is modied to explicitly account for dynamic
cost e¢ ciency based on the dynamic e¢ cient production technology cong-
ured previously. Hommas (2009, 2012) quasi-short-run prots are redened
using the dynamic frontier and actual variable cost functions derived and
dened in the previous subsection. Moreover, the dynamic-uncertainty be-
havior of nancial rms congured by Homma (2009, 2012) is reformulated
to explicitly account for the e¤ects of Herndahl indices in the previous pe-
riod and static cost e¢ ciency in the previous period. Furthermore, on the
basis of this formulation, Hommas (2009, 2012) stochastic Euler equations
are rederived, and the GURPs and EGLIs are redened to explicitly reveal
the di¤erence between the frontier and the actual by transforming these
equations.
2.2.1 Quasi-Short-Run Prots Using Dynamic Frontier and Ac-
tual Variable Cost Functions
In the context of dynamic e¢ cient production technology, quasi-short-run
prot dened by Homma (2009, 2012) is improved upon in the following
three respects. First, the Herndahl indices in the previous period and sta-
tic cost e¢ ciency in the previous period are added to the exogenous vari-
ables a¤ecting quasi-short-run prot. Second, the stochastic endogenous
holding-revenue and holding-cost rates dened by Homma (2009, 2012) are
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replaced by stochastic dynamic endogenous holding-revenue rates (hereafter
SDEHRRs) and stochastic dynamic endogenous holding-cost rates (hereafter
SDEHCRs), respectively. Third, the static frontier variable cost function is
similarly replaced by a dynamic frontier variable cost function or a dynamic
actual variable cost function. Quasi-short-run prots are dened as follows.
Denition 9 (Quasi-Short-Run Prot Based on Dynamic Frontier Cost)
The quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost of the i-th -
nancial rm during period t, denoted by QSFi
 
qi;t 1;qi;t; zi;t

, is dened as
follows:
QSFi
 
qi;t 1;qi;t; zi;t

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zDHi;j;t 1

+  i;j;t
	  pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1   pG;t  qi;j;t
  CDFVi
 
qi;t; z
C
i;t

, (t  1), (2.2.1.1)
QSFi
 
qi;0; z

i;0

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj 

bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;0; z
DH
i;j;0

+  i;j;0
	 pG;0 qi;j;0 CDFVi  qi;0; zCi;0 ,
(2.2.1.2)
where zi;t =
 
zDH0i;t 1; 
0
i;t; pG;t 1; pG;t; z
C0
i;t
0
(t  0) are vectors of exogenous
variables a¤ecting quasi-short-run prot, and in the case of t = 0, zi;0 = 
zDH0i;0 ; 
0
i;0; pG;0; ; z
C0
i;0
0
. More specically, zDHi;t 1 =
 
HI0t 2; EF
S
i;t 2; z
H0
i;t 1
0
(t  0) are vectors of exogenous variables a¤ecting the certain or predictable
components of SDEHRR and SDEHCR in the period t   1 (  1), and in
the case of t  1,
zDHi; 1 =
 
HI0 2; EF
S
i; 2; z
H0
i; 1
0
= zDHi;0 =
 
HI0 1; EF
S
i; 1; z
H0
i;0
0
= zHi;0.
zHi;t 1 =
 
zH0i;1;t 1;   ; zH0i;NA+NL;t 1
0
(t  0) are vectors of exogenous variables
other than Herndahl indices two periods prior and static cost e¢ ciency two
periods prior, and in the case of t = 0, zHi; 1 = z
H
i;0 =
 
zH0i;1;0;   ; zH0i;NA+NL;0
0
.
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i;t =
 
 i;1;t;   ;  i;NA+NL;t
0
(t  0) are vectors of the uncertain or unpre-
dictable components of SDEHRR and SDEHCR, and pG;t (t  0) are general
price indices. zCi;t =

p0i;t; z
Q0
i;t ; b1 HI0t 1; b1  EF Si;t 1;  i;t
0
(t  0) are vectors
of exogenous variables a¤ecting the dynamic frontier variable cost function.
bj is a parameter distinguishing between nancial assets and liabilities: bj = 1
for nancial assets (i.e., j = 1; :::; NA), and bj =  1 for liabilities (i.e.,
j = NA+1; :::; NA+NL). bC hRi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zDHi;j;t 1

+  i;j;t (j = 1; :::; NA+NL)
are the SDEHRRs or the SDEHCRs of the j-th nancial good of the i-th rm
at the end of period t   1, and bC is a parameter distinguishing cash from
other nancial assets. In other words, if qi;j;t represents cash (i.e., j = 1),
then bC = 0, whereas if the nancial good is another type of nancial asset
(i.e., j 6= 1), then bC = 1. hRi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zDHi;j;t 1

is the certain or predictable
component of the SDEHRR or the SDEHCR, and Qj;t 1 is total j-th nancial
goods (i.e., nancial assets or liabilities) in the market.
Denition 10 (Quasi-Short-Run Prot Based on Dynamic Actual Cost)
The quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic actual cost of the i-th -
nancial rm during period t, denoted by QSAi
 
qi;t 1;qi;t; zi;t

, is dened by
replacing the dynamic frontier variable cost function CDFVi (; ) in Denition
9 with the dynamic actual variable cost function CDAVi (; ) as follows:
QSAi
 
qi;t 1;qi;t; zi;t

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zDHi;j;t 1

+  i;j;t
	  pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1   pG;t  qi;j;t
  CDAVi
 
qi;t; z
C
i;t

, (t  1), (2.2.1.3)
QSAi
 
qi;0; z

i;0

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj 

bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;0; z
DH
i;j;0

+  i;j;0
	 pG;0 qi;j;0 CDAVi  qi;0; zCi;0 ,
(2.2.1.4)
where QSAi
 
qi;t 1;qi;t; zi;t

is not greater than QSFi
 
qi;t 1;qi;t; zi;t

(i.e.,
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QSAi
 
qi;t 1;qi;t; zi;t
  QSFi  qi;t 1;qi;t; zi;t), because CDAVi  qi;t; zCi;t is
not less than CDFVi
 
qi;t; z
C
i;t

(i.e., CDAVi
 
qi;t; z
C
i;t
  CDFVi  qi;t; zCi;t).
The SDEHRR (or the SDEHCR) in Denitions 9 and 10 is the revenue
obtained (or cost required) from holdings per currency unit for a single time
period. Thus,

bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zDHi;j;t 1

+  i;j;t
	  pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1 is the holding
revenue or cost, which is received or paid at the end of period t   1, and
the net cash ow of the i-th rm produced by nancial good j in period t is
dened as
bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zDHi;j;t 1

+  i;j;t
	  pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1   pG;t  qi;j;t .
For example, for an asset such as a loan (with the exception of cash), bj = 1,
in which case the second and third terms,

bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zDHi;j;t 1

+  i;j;t
	 
pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1, indicate holding revenues, and the rst and fourth terms,
pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1   pG;t  qi;j;t, represent the change in the nominal asset for the
period. If loan repayments by the borrower exceed total new loans for the
period, the revised balance indicates a positive change, and if repayments are
lower than total new loans for the period, the value is negative. These terms
thus express the net cash ow resulting from the acceptance of an asset.
However, cash, which is an asset, generates no interest. As such, the holding
revenue for cash is zero. Similarly, in the case of a liability such as a deposit,
bj =  1, the second and third terms,  

bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zDHi;j;t 1

+  i;j;t
	 
pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1, indicate holding costs, whereas the rst and fourth terms,
 pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1 + pG;t  qi;j;t, represent nominal liability change. The change
is therefore positive if new deposits exceed withdrawals and negative if new
deposits are less than withdrawals. These terms thus indicate the net cash
ow resulting from the issuance of a liability.
2.2.2 Dynamic-Uncertainty Behavior and Stochastic Euler Equa-
tions
To formulate the dynamic-uncertainty behavior of nancial rms as a sto-
chastic dynamic programming problem (hereafter SDP), similar to Homma
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( 2009, 2012), the following three key assumptions are made. First, the de-
cision of the nancial rm is made after uncertainty is resolved, such that,
in each period, the nancial rm chooses the state variable of the next pe-
riod directly. Second, the nancial rm chooses a plan that maximizes the
expected value of the discounted intertemporal utility function of a stream
of planned quasi-short-run prots and planned equity capital. Third, the in-
tertemporal utility function is additively separable. The reason for the rst
key assumption is that the adjustment cost of stock variables is assumed to
be zero and more reliable information on the decision leads to a rise in the
value of the rm. In the second key assumption, the utility function is used
to explicitly account for the e¤ect of risk attitudes other than risk neutrality,
and the utility function depends on planned equity capital to account for
(although indirectly) the risk of the burden of nancial distress costs from
a banking theory perspective because an increase in equity capital reduces
this risk. The third key assumption is conventional and widely held.
These key assumptions are based on the following three underlying as-
sumptions. First, the state variables are classied as either endogenous or
exogenous. The endogenous state variable vectors qi;t (t  0) are vectors
of real balances of nancial goods, and the exogenous state variable vectors
zi;t (t  0) are those which a¤ect quasi-short-run prots zi;t (t  0) (i.e.,
zi;t = z

i;t). Within these exogenous variables, the vectors of those exogenous
variables that a¤ect equity capital are dened as zei;t =
 
pG;t; z
C0
i;t
0
(t  0).
Second, the exogenous state variable vectors zi;t (t  0) are vectors of ran-
dom variables, and the stochastic term fzi;tgt0 follows a stationary Markov
process. Let (Z;BZ) be a measurable space, where Z is a set of zi;t, and
BZ is a -algebra of its subsets. In this case, the stochastic properties of the
exogenous state variables can be expressed as a stationary transition func-
tion: Q : Z  BZ ! [0; 1].2 The interpretation of this denition is that
Q (zi;t; Ai;t+1) is the probability that the state of the next period lies in the
set Ai;t+1, given that the current state is zi;t. The product space of (Z;BZ)
is expressed as
 
Zt;BtZ

= (Z      Z;BZ     BZ), and zi;0 (2 Z) is
2For further details regarding the stationary transition function, see Stokey and Lucas
(1989, p.212).
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given. Third, the decision to be made in period t can depend on informa-
tion that will be available at that time. This information can be expressed
as a sequence of vectors of exogenous state variables. Let zti = (zi;1; :::; zi;t)
(2 Zt) denote the partial history in periods 1 through t, and let (Y;BY )
be a measurable space, where Y is a set of vectors of the endogenous state
variables qi;t, and BY is a -algebra of its subsets. A plan q
p
i is then dened
as the set of a value qpi;0 (2 Y ) and a sequence of functions qpi;t : Zt ! Y
(t  1), where qpi;t (zti) is the value of qi;t+1 that will be chosen in period t if
the partial history of the exogenous state variables in periods 1 through t is
zti (i.e., q
p
i =
n
qpi;0;

qpi;t (z
t
i)
	1
t=1
o
).
From the second underlying assumption, the following denition of prob-
ability measures is proposed.
Denition 11 (Probability Measure) The probability measures on
 
Zt;BtZ

,
t (zi;0;  ) : BtZ ! [0; 1] (t  1), are dened as follows.3 For any rectangle
Ati = Ai;1      Ai;t 2 BtZ,
t
 
zi;0; A
t
i

=
Z
Ai;1

Z
Ai;t 1
Z
Ai;t
Q (zi;t 1;dzi;t)Q (zi;t 2;dzi;t 1)Q (zi;0;dzi;1) ,
(2.2.2.1)
where the probability measure t (zi;0;  ) satises the properties of measures,
and t (zi;0; Zt) = 1.
From this denition of probability measures and the above key and un-
derlying assumptions, the SDP of the i-th nancial rm is formulated as
follows:
max
qpi
ui
h
QSFi
 
qi;0;q
p
i;0 (zi;0) ; z

i;0

; qpe;i
 
qpi;0 (zi;0) ; z
e
i;0
i
+ lim
T!1
XT
t=1
Z
Zt
ti  ui
h
QSFi
 
qpi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;qpi;t
 
zti

; zi;t

;
qpe;i
 
qpi;t
 
zti

; zei;t

t
 
zi;0;dz
t
i

, (2.2.2.2)
3For a comprehensive account of probability measures, see Stokey and Lucas (1989:
pp. 220-225).
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where ui (; ) is the utility function, ti =
Yt 1
s=0
i;s =
Yt 1
s=0
1
1 + rDi;s
is the
cumulative discount factor, and rDi;s is the subjective rate of time preference.
4
QSFi
 
qpi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z

i;t

(t  1) and QSFi
 
qi;0;q
p
i;0 (zi;0) ; z

i;0

are
the planned quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost, which
are as follows:
QSFi
 
qpi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;qpi;t
 
zti

; zi;t

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qpj;t 1; z
DH
i;j;t 1

+  i;j;t
	  pG;t 1  qpi;j;t 1  zt 1i 
 pG;t  qpi;j;t
 
zti
  CDFVi  qpi;t  zti ; zCi;t (t  1), (2.2.2.3)
QSFi
 
qi;0;q
p
i;0 (zi;0) ; z

i;0

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;0; z
DH
i;j;0

+  i;j;0
	  pG;0  qi;j;0
 pG;0  qpi;j;0 (zi;0)
  CDFVi  qpi;0 (zi;0) ; zCi;0 . (2.2.2.4)
The functions in these planned quasi-short-run prots (Eqs. (2.2.2.3) and
(2.2.2.4)) are dened as follows.
 hRi;j
 
Qpj;t 1; z
DH
i;j;t 1

: Planned certain or predictable component of the
SDEHRR or the SDEHCR. Using this component, the planned SDEHRR
or the planned SDEHCR is dened as bC  hRi;j
 
Qpj;t 1; z
DH
i;j;t 1

+  i;j;t;
j = 1; :::; NA+NL, where Q
p
j;t 1 is the planned total j-th nancial good
in the market. Other vectors and variables (i.e., zDHi;j;t 1 and  i;j;t) are
as dened above.
 CDFVi
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
C
i;t

: Planned dynamic frontier variable cost function.
4For details regarding this optimization problem, see Stokey and Lucas (1989, pp.241-
254).
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In addition, qpe;i
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
e
i;t

(t  0) is the planned equity capital, given by
qpe;i
 
qpi;t
 
zti

; zei;t

=
NAX
j=1
pG;t  qpi;j;t
 
zti

+
MFX
j=1
pFi;j;t  xpF;i;j
 
qpi;t
 
zti

; zCi;t

 
NA+NLX
j=NA+1
pG;t  qpi;j;t
 
zti

, (t  0), (2.2.2.5)
where pFi;j;t is the j-th real resource xed factor price,
5 and xpF;i;j
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
C
i;t

is the conditional factor demand function for the j-th planned real resource
xed input.
The necessary conditions for the SDP in sequence form can be found by
adopting a variational approach. Such conditions are represented by stochas-
tic Euler equations, which for the above SDP (2.2.2.2) are expressed as
  @u
F
i;t
@QSFi;t

 
bj  pG;t +
@CDFV i;t
@qpi;j;t
!
+ bj  pG;t 
@uFi;t
@qpe;i;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 
Z
Z
(
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t +
@hRi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
!
+  i;j;t+1
)
 @u
F
i;t+1
@QSFi;t+1
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0; j = 1; :::; NA +NL, (2.2.2.6)
where qpi;j;t = q
p
i;j;t (z
t
i) (j = 1; ; NA+NL) denote the optimal levels for nan-
cial goods. Furthermore, QSFi;t = 
QSF
i
 
qpi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z

i;t

, qpe;i;t =
qpe;i
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
e
i;t

, uFi;t = ui

QSFi;t ; q
p
e;i;t

, CDFV i;t = C
DFV
i
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
C
i;t

,
and hRi;j;t = h
R
i;j
 
Qpj;t; z
DH
i;j;t

(j = 1;   ; NA + NL). For dzi;t+1, the following
5pFi;j;t is an element of pi;t. p
F
i;j;t is therefore an element of z
C
i;t because pi;t is an element
of zCi;t.
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equality holds:
dzi;t+1 = dz

i;t+1 =
 
dzDH0i;t ;d
0
i;t+1; dpG;t; dpG;t+1;dz
C0
i;t+1
0
=

d 0i;t+1; dpG;t+1;dp
0
i;t+1;dz
Q0
i;t+1; d i;t+1
0
( * dzDHi;t = 0Z , dpG;t = 0, dHIt = 0HI , and dEFDi;t = 0).
If the utility function uFi;t is concave and continuously di¤erentiable in
qpi;t 1 and q
p
i;t and is integrable,
6 and if each of the partial derivatives of
uFi;t with respect to q
p
i;t 1 is absolutely integrable,
7 then the stochastic Euler
equations (2.2.2.6) with the transversality conditions
lim
t!1
ti 
Z
Z
@uFi;t+1
@QSFi;t+1
 @
QSF
i;t+1
@qpi;j;t
 qpi;j;tQ (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0; j = 1; :::; NA +NL
(2.2.2.7)
are su¢ cient conditions for an optimal plan qpi =
n
qpi;0;

qpi;t
	1
t=1
o
.
Equation (2.2.2.6) is the stochastic Euler equations in the case of no
dynamic cost ine¢ ciency and no dynamic price ine¢ ciencies (i.e., no dynamic
pricing errors). However, to derive not only the GURP on the cost frontier
but also the GURP on the actual cost, these ine¢ ciencies need to be explicitly
considered. If these ine¢ ciencies exist, Eq. (2.2.2.6) is corrected as follows:
  @u
A
i;t
@QSAi;t

 
bj  pG;t +
@CDAV i;t
@qpi;j;t
!
+ bj  pG;t 
@uAi;t
@qpe;i;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 
Z
Z
(
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t +
@hRi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
!
+  i;j;t+1
)
 @u
A
i;t+1
@QSAi;t+1
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = "
P
i;j;t; j = 1; :::; NA +NL, (2.2.2.8)
where QSAi;t (= 
QSA
i
 
qpi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z

i;t

) is the maximum planned
6Integrability of uFi;t means that
R
Z
uFi;t Q (zi;t 1;dzi;t) <1.
7Absolute integrability of
@uFi;t
@qpi;j;t 1
is dened as
R
Z
 @uFi;t@qpi;j;t 1
 Q (zi;t 1;dzi;t) <1.
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quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost, uAi;t (= ui

QSAi;t ; q
p
e;i;t

)
is the maximum planned utility based on this quasi-short-run prot, CDAV i;t
(= CDAVi
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
C
i;t

) is the planned dynamic actual variable cost, and
"Pi;j;t (j = 1; :::; NA + NL) are terms used to explicitly account for dynamic
price ine¢ ciencies (i.e., dynamic pricing errors). More specically, if no dy-
namic price ine¢ ciency exists, then "Pi;j;t = 0, whereas if any dynamic price
ine¢ ciency exists, then "Pi;j;t 6= 0. In the case of no dynamic cost ine¢ ciency
and no dynamic price ine¢ ciencies, Eq. (2.2.2.8) equals Eq. (2.2.2.6).
2.2.3 Risk Corrections, GURP on the Cost Frontier, and GURP
on the Actual Cost
Similar to Homma (2009, 2012), the GURP on the cost frontier and the
GURP on the actual cost (see below) can be derived by transforming the
stochastic Euler equations (Eqs. (2.2.2.6) and (2.2.2.8)). More specically,
rst, similar to the treatment in the consumption-based capital asset pricing
model (hereafter CCAPM), Eqs. (2.2.2.6) and (2.2.2.8) are transformed into
an expression of risk correction. Next, these transformed equations are again
transformed with respect to dynamic frontier marginal variable cost or dy-
namic actual marginal variable cost and rearranged. Finally, the right-hand
sides of these retransformed equations are dened as the GURP on the cost
frontier and the GURP on the actual cost, respectively. The form of the Eq.
(2.2.2.6) expression of risk correction is provided by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Under the assumption that @uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t 6= 0 and E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t =
0, Eq.(2.2.2.6) can be transformed into an expression of risk correction as fol-
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lows:
  bj  pG;t  MCDFV i;j;t + bj  pG;t MRSFe;i;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
	  E IMRSF;i;t+1 jzi;t 
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
F
i;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
 zi;t
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t
= 0;
j = 1; :::; NA +NL, (2.2.3.1)
where MCDFV i;j;t = @C
DFV 
i;t

@qpi;j;t , MRS
F
e;i;t =
 
@uFi;t

@qpe;i;t
.
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t

,8
i;j;t = @h
R
i;j;t

@ ln qpi;j;t , IMRS
F
;i;t+1 =

@uFi;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
.
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t

,9
and E [  jzi;t ] =
R
Z
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1).
8This term is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of quasi-short-run prot based
on the dynamic frontier cost for equity capital. This MRS quanties the rate at which the
nancial rm is just willing to substitute quasi-short-run prot for equity capital, or, in
other words, it is a measure of the opportunity costs of equity capital.
9This term represents the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) with
respect to quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost. This IMRS quanties
the rate at which the nancial rm is just willing to substitute quasi-short-run prot in
period t for prot in period t +1. If the nancial rm is risk averse, the marginal utility
of quasi-short-run prot is a decreasing function of quasi-short-run prot. The IMRS
therefore declines if quasi-short-run prot increases from the current period to the next
period and rises if prots fall.
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Proof. Both sides of Eq. (2.2.2.6) are divided by @uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t , provided
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t 6= 0, which gives
  bj  pG;t  
@CDFV i;t
@qpi;j;t
+ bj  pG;t 
@uFi;t

@qpe;i;t
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 
Z
Z
(
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t +
@hRi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
!
+  i;j;t+1
)

@uFi;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0; j = 1; :::; NA +NL. (T1.1)
To simplify the expressions, the notation of Theorem 1 is used. Eq. (T1.1)
can then be rewritten as
  bj  pG;t  MCDFV i;j;t + bj  pG;t MRSFe;i;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t  E

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  IMRSF;i;t+1 jzi;t  = 0;
j = 1; :::; NA +NL. (T1.2)
To transform these equations into explicit expressions of risk correction, the
expectation in the third term of the left-hand side of Eq. (T1.2) is trans-
formed by the same method as employed in the CCAPM. Let wi;j;t+1 =
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1. The expectation in the third term is then
expressed as E

wi;j;t+1  IMRSF;i;t+1
 zi;t. As in the CCAPM, the covariance
of wi;j;t+1 with respect to IMRS
F
;i;t+1, cov
 
wi;j;t+1; IMRS
F
;i;t+1
 zi;t, is the
focus of attention. Using the property of covariance
cov
 
wi;j;t+1; IMRS
F
;i;t+1
 zi;t = E wi;j;t+1  IMRSF;i;t+1 zi;t
 E wi;j;t+1 zi;t  E IMRSF;i;t+1 zi;t ,
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E

wi;j;t+1  IMRSF;i;t+1
 zi;t can be written as
E

wi;j;t+1  IMRSF;i;t+1
 zi;t = E wi;j;t+1 zi;t  E IMRSF;i;t+1 zi;t
+cov
 
wi;j;t+1; IMRS
F
;i;t+1
 zi;t . (T1.3)
Substituting wi;j;t+1 = 1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1 for E

wi;j;t+1
 zi;t,
under the assumption that E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t = 0, leads to
E

wi;j;t+1
 zi;t = 1 + bC   hRi;j;t + i;j;t . (T1.4)
Substituting wi;j;t+1 = 1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1 and IMRS
F
;i;t+1 =
@uFi;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
.
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t

for cov
 
wi;j;t+1; IMRS
F
;i;t+1
 zi;t, the
property of covariance gives the following:
cov
 
wi;j;t+1; IMRS
F
;i;t+1
 zi;t
= cov
 
 i;j;t+1; IMRS
F
;i;t+1
 zi;t
=
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
F
i;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
 zi;t
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t
. (T1.5)
Substituting Eqs. (T1.4) and (T1.5) for Eq. (T1.3), the expectation in the
third term of the left-hand side of Eq. (T1.2) can be transformed to explicitly
express risk corrections, as follows:
E

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  IMRSF;i;t+1 jzi;t 
=

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
	  E IMRSF;i;t+1 jzi;t 
+
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
F
i;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
 zi;t
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t
. (T1.6)
Substituting Eq. (T1.6) into Eq. (T1.2) thus adds a risk-adjustment term,
as given by Eq. (2.2.3.1).
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Similarly, the form of the Eq. (2.2.2.8) expression of risk correction is
provided by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Under the assumption that @uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t 6= 0 and E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t =
0, Eq. (2.2.2.8) can be transformed into an expression of risk correction as
follows:
  bj  pG;t  MCDAV i;j;t + bj  pG;t MRSAe;i;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
	  E IMRSA;i;t+1 jzi;t 
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
A
i;t+1
.
@QSAi;t+1
 zi;t
@uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t
= PIEi;j;t;
j = 1; :::; NA +NL, (2.2.3.2)
where MCDAV i;j;t = @C
DAV 
i;t

@qpi;j;t , MRS
A
e;i;t =
 
@uAi;t

@qpe;i;t
.
@uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t

,10
IMRSA;i;t+1 =

@uAi;t+1
.
@QSAi;t+1
.
@uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t

,11 and PIEi;j;t =
"Pi;j;t
.
@uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t

, which is the price ine¢ ciency normalized by the
marginal utility of quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 with two exceptions,
so we omit the derivation. First, CDFV i;t , u
F
i;t , 
QSF
i;t , u
F
i;t+1, and 
QSF
i;t+1 in Eq.
(2.2.3.1) are replaced by CDAV i;t , u
A
i;t , 
QSA
i;t , u
A
i;t+1, and 
QSA
i;t+1 , respectively.
Second, PIE i;j;t is added to the right-hand side of Eq. (2.2.3.1).
As similarly described by Homma (2009, 2012), the fractions in the fth
terms on the left-hand sides of Eqs. (2.2.3.1) and (2.2.3.2),
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
F
i;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
 zi;t.@uFi;t .@QSFi;t  and
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
A
i;t+1
.
@QSAi;t+1
 zi;t.@uAi;t .@QSAi;t  ,
10The interpretation of this term is similar to MRSFe;i;t in Eq. (2.2.3.1) with the excep-
tion of replacing uFi;t and 
QSF
i;t in MRS
F
e;i;t with u
A
i;t and 
QSA
i;t , respectively.
11The interpretation of this term is similar to IMRSF;i;t+1 in Eq. (2.2.3.1) with the
exception of replacing uFi;t , 
QSF
i;t , u
F
i;t+1, and 
QSF
i;t+1 in IMRS
F
;i;t+1 with u
A
i;t , 
QSA
i;t ,
uAi;t+1, and 
QSA
i;t+1 , respectively.
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i.e., the ratio of the covariance of uncertain components of the SDEHRR and
the SDEHCR with respect to the marginal utility of quasi-short-run prot
based on the dynamic frontier cost in period t+1 to the same marginal utility
in period t and the ratio of the covariance of the same uncertain components
with respect to the marginal utility of quasi-short-run prot based on dy-
namic actual cost in period t+1 to the same marginal utility in period t, are
risk-adjustment terms. If nancial rms are risk averse, the marginal utility
of quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost or dynamic actual
cost is a decreasing function of prot. Therefore, cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QSF
i;t+1
 zi;t and
cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QSA
i;t+1
 zi;t are positive if cov i;j;t+1; @uFi;t+1.@QSFi;t+1  zi;t and
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
A
i;t+1
.
@QSAi;t+1
 zi;t are negative, respectively, and vice versa.
In this case, the variance of quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic frontier
cost or dynamic actual cost in the next period increases if a nancial asset in
the current period increases, whereas the same variance decreases if a liability
in the current period increases, and vice versa. For example, if  (0 <  < 1)
of the j-th nancial good in period t increases, then from Eq. (2.2.1.1) (or
Eq. (2.2.1.3)), quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost (or
the quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost) in the next period
becomes
QSFi;t+1 + bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t; z
DH
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  pG;t  
(or QSAi;t+1 + bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t; z
DH
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  pG;t  ).
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In this case, its variance can be expressed as
var

QSFi;t+1 + bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t; z
DH
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  pG;t   zi;t
= var

QSFi;t+1
 zi;t+ 2  bj  pG;t    cov i;j;t+1; QSFi;t+1 zi;t
+(bj  pG;t  )2  var
 
 i;j;t+1
 zi;t
(or var

QSAi;t+1 + bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t; z
DH
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  pG;t   zi;t
= var

QSAi;t+1
 zi;t+ 2  bj  pG;t    cov i;j;t+1; QSAi;t+1 zi;t
+(bj  pG;t  )2  var
 
 i;j;t+1
 zi;t ). (2.2.3.3)
Thus, if  is su¢ ciently small, the third term on the right-hand side of this
equation is much smaller than the second term. The sign of the second term,
cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QSF
i;t+1
 zi;t (or cov i;j;t+1; QSAi;t+1 zi;t), determines whether this
variance is greater than var

QSFi;t+1
 zi;t (or varQSAi;t+1 zi;t). Thus, if the j-
th nancial good is a nancial asset (i.e., bj = 1), the variance is greater than
var

QSFi;t+1
 zi;t (or varQSAi;t+1 zi;t) if the sign of cov i;j;t+1; QSFi;t+1 zi;t (or
cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QSA
i;t+1
 zi;t) is positive. Similarly, if the j-th nancial good is
a liability (i.e., bj =  1), this variance is greater than var

QSFi;t+1
 zi;t (or
var

QSAi;t+1
 zi;t) if the sign of cov i;j;t+1; QSFi;t+1 zi;t (or cov i;j;t+1; QSAi;t+1 zi;t)
is negative.
To derive and dene the GURP on the cost frontier, the following corol-
lary to Theorem 1 is established.
Corollary 1 (to Theorem 1) Equation (2.2.3.1) can be expressed as fol-
lows:
MCDFV i;j;t = bj pG;t
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFFi;t
  
1 + rFFi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFFi;t

+MRSFe;i;t +$
F
i;j;t

; j = 1; :::; NA +NL, (2.2.3.4)
where rFFi;t (= 1

E

i;t  IMRSF;i;t+1 jzi;t
   1) is the reference rate on the
cost frontier corresponding to the risk-free rate referred to in the CCAPM
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and $Fi;j;t (= i;t  cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
F
i;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
 zi;t.@uFi;t .@QSFi;t ) is
the discounted risk-adjustment term on the cost frontier.
Proof. Transforming Eq. (2.2.3.1) with respect toMCDFV i;j;t and rearranging
then gives
MCDFV i;j;t = bjpG;t

bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
   1E i;t  IMRSF;i;t+1 jzi;t    1	
E i;t  IMRSF;i;t+1 jzi;t +MRSFe;i;t + i;t  cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
F
i;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
 zi;t
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t
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= bjpG;t

bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
  rFFi;t 	 1 + rFFi;t  +MRSFe;i;t +$Fi;j;t
= bjpG;t
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFFi;t
  
1 + rFFi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFFi;t

+MRSFe;i;t +$
F
i;j;t

;
j = 1; :::; NA +NL.
Similarly, to derive and dene the GURP on the actual cost, the following
corollary to Theorem 2 is formulated.
Corollary 2 (to Theorem 2) Equation (2.2.3.2) can be expressed as fol-
lows:
MCDAV i;j;t + PIEi;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFAi;t
  
1 + rFAi;t

+bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFAi;t

+MRSAe;i;t +$
A
i;j;t

; j = 1; :::; NA +NL, (2.2.3.5)
where rFAi;t (= 1

E

i;t  IMRSA;i;t+1 jzi;t
 1) is the reference rate on the ac-
tual cost and$Ai;j;t (= i;tcov

 i;j;t+1; @u
A
i;t+1
.
@QSAi;t+1
 zi;t.@uAi;t .@QSAi;t )
is the discounted risk-adjustment term on the actual cost.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 1 to Theorem 1 with
two exceptions, so we omit the derivation. First, MCDFV i;j;t , r
FF
i;t , MRS
F
e;i;t ,
and$Fi;j;t in Eq. (2.2.3.4) are replaced byMC
DAV 
i;j;t , r
FA
i;t ,MRS
A
e;i;t , and$
A
i;j;t,
respectively. Second, PIE i;j;t is added to the left-hand side of Eq. (2.2.3.4).
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The right-hand sides of Eqs. (2.2.3.4) and (2.2.3.5) are then the prices of
the j-th nancial good because they are equivalent toMCDFV i;j;t andMC
DAV 
i;j;t +PIE i;j;t,
respectively. From the perspective of production theory, these corollaries are
thus used as denitions for the GURP on the cost frontier and the GURP
on the actual cost, respectively.
Denition 12 (Generalized User-Revenue Price on the Cost Frontier)
The generalized user-revenue price on the cost frontier of the j-th nancial
good of the i-th nancial rm in period t, denoted by pGURFi;j;t , is dened as
pGURFi;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFFi;t
  
1 + rFFi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFFi;t

+MRSFe;i;t +$
F
i;j;t

= pSURFi;j;t + 
BPF
i;j;t +MRS
BPF
e;i;t +$
BPF
i;j;t ; j = 1; :::; NA +NL, (2.2.3.6)
where pSURFi;j;t (= bjpG;t
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFFi;t
  
1 + rFFi;t

) is the stochastic user-
revenue price on the cost frontier similarly dened by Homma (2009, 2012),
BPFi;j;t (= bj  pG;t  bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFFi;t

) expresses the market structure and
conduct e¤ect on the cost frontier, MRSBPFe;i;t (= bj  pG;tMRSFe;i;t ) expresses
the equity capital e¤ect on the cost frontier, and $BPFi;j;t (= bj  pG;t  $Fi;j;t)
expresses the risk-adjustment e¤ect on the cost frontier.
Denition 13 (Generalized User-Revenue Price on the Actual Cost)
The generalized user-revenue price on the actual cost of the j-th nancial good
of the i-th nancial rm in period t, denoted by pGURAi;j;t , is dened as
pGURAi;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFAi;t
  
1 + rFAi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFAi;t

+MRSAe;i;t +$
A
i;j;t

= pSURAi;j;t + 
BPA
i;j;t +MRS
BPA
e;i;t +$
BPA
i;j;t ; j = 1; :::; NA +NL, (2.2.3.7)
where pSURAi;j;t (= bj pG;t
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFAi;t
  
1 + rFAi;t

) is the stochastic user-
revenue price on the actual cost similarly dened by Homma (2009, 2012),
BPAi;j;t (= bj  pG;t  bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFAi;t

) expresses the market structure and
conduct e¤ect on the actual cost, MRSBPAe;i;t (= bj  pG;tMRSAe;i;t ) expresses
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the equity capital e¤ect on the actual cost, and $BPAi;j;t (= bj  pG;t  $Ai;j;t)
expresses the risk-adjustment e¤ect on the actual cost.
As similarly noted by Homma (2009, 2012), the four terms on the right-
hand sides of Eqs. (2.2.3.6) and (2.2.3.7) represent the stochastic user-
revenue price (hereafter SURP), market structure and conduct e¤ects, equity
capital e¤ects, and risk-adjustment e¤ects, respectively. Especially, i;j;t in
the second term of the right-hand side of Eqs. (2.2.3.6) and (2.2.3.7) reects
the e¤ects of market structure of the j-th nancial good and the strategic
interdependence of nancial rms, as expressed by
i;j;t =
@hRi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
=
qpi;j;t
Qpj;t
 @h
R
i;j;t
@ lnQpj;t

 
1 +
XNF
k 6=i
@qpk;j;t
@qpi;j;t
!
= si;j;t  Qi;j;t 
 
1 + CV i;j;t

; j = 1; :::; NA +NL, (2.2.3.8)
where si;j;t (= q
p
i;j;t

Qpj;t ) is the ratio of the real balance of the j-th nancial
good of the i-th nancial rm to the total balance in the market for the
j-th nancial good. The range of si;j;t is 0 < s

i;j;t  1, and si;j;t = 1 if the
i-th nancial rm has a monopoly. In addition, Qi;j;t (= @h
R
i;j;t

@ lnQpj;t ) is
the elasticity of the certain or predictable components of the SDEHRR or
the SDEHCR for the j-th nancial good with respect to the total balance
in the market, and represents the fractional change in the former due to
a 1% increase in the latter. Furthermore, CV i;j;t (=
PNF
k 6=i @q
p
k;j;t

@qpi;j;t ) is
the conjectural derivative quantifying how the i-th nancial rm regards the
changes in the j-th nancial good of other rms with respect to the change in
the j-th nancial good of the i-th nancial rm in period t. If si;j;t = 1 and
CV i;j;t = 0, then the i-th nancial rm has a monopoly in the j-th nancial
good market in period t. If CV i;j;t = 0, then the i-th nancial rm is a
Cournot rm, i.e., the outputs of all other nancial rms are not expected to
change as the output of the i-th nancial rm changes. If CV i;j;t =  1, then
the i-th nancial rm is a competitive rm, i.e., i;j;t is zero. Higher values
of CV i;j;t correspond to larger absolute values of 

i;j;t, and thus represent less
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intense competition.12
From these denitions and the above two corollaries, the following two
remarks immediately follow.
Remark 1 From Corollary 1 to Theorem 1 and Denition 12,
MCDFV i;j;t = p
GURF
i;j;t ; j = 1; :::; NA +NL (2.2.3.9)
holds, and thus the classication of nancial goods into inputs and outputs
based on the sign of each GURP on the cost frontier is consistent with the
classication based on the sign of each partial derivative of the dynamic fron-
tier variable cost function with respect to nancial goods (i.e., the sign of
each dynamic frontier marginal variable cost). The sign of the dynamic fron-
tier marginal variable cost is the same as the sign of the GURP on the cost
frontier, indicating that a nancial good is an output if positive and a xed
input if negative.
Remark 2 From Corollary 2 to Theorem 2 and Denition 13,
MCDAV i;j;t + PIEi;j;t = p
GURA
i;j;t ; j = 1; :::; NA +NL (2.2.3.10)
holds, and thus the classication of nancial goods into inputs and outputs
based on the sign of each GURP on the actual cost is not always consistent
12The concept of conjectural variation is popular in both theoretical and empirical stud-
ies of industrial organization. Theorists of industrial organization, however, regard it
critically for the following reasons: 1) it represents ad hoc assumptions about the con-
duct of rms, 2) it lacks a game-theoretic foundation, and 3) it forces dynamics into
an essentially static model with the strategy space and time horizon of the underlying
game being only loosely dened (e.g., Fellner, 1949; Friedman, 1983, p. 110; Daughety,
1985; Makowski, 1987; Tirole, 1989, pp. 244245). These shortcomings are often recog-
nized as the cost that the modeler must pay for realism without sacricing simplicity and
tractability (i.e., parsimony). However, Dockner (1992), Cabral (1995), and Pfa¤ermayr
(1999) have demonstrated that the concept of conjectural variation can be supported by
a consistent theoretical foundation, if it is considered to be a reduced form of a dynamic
game. Their ndings can be used to justify a static conjectural variations analysis for
both modeling dynamic interactions and estimating the degree of oligopoly power. From
this viewpoint, we believe that the use of the conjectural derivative is rationalized by
considering the derivative to be a reduced form of an (unmodeled) dynamic game.
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with the classication based on the sign of each partial derivative of the dy-
namic actual variable cost function with respect to nancial goods (i.e., the
sign of each dynamic actual marginal variable cost). Both classications are
consistent in the following two limited cases: 1) the sign of dynamic actual
marginal variable cost is the same as the sign of price ine¢ ciency normal-
ized by the marginal utility of quasi-short-run prots based on dynamic actual
cost, and 2) if both signs are not equal, then the absolute value of dynamic
actual marginal variable cost is greater than the absolute value of normalized
price ine¢ ciency.
From these remarks and Proposition 1, the following remark immediately
follows.
Remark 3 From Remarks 1 and 2 and Proposition 1, the GURP on the cost
frontier is related to the GURP on the actual cost as follows:
pGURFi;j;t =
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=; pGURAi;j;t   PIEi;j;t ; j = 1; :::; NA+NL.
(2.2.3.11)
From this remark, similar to the relation between dynamic frontier mar-
ginal variable cost and dynamic actual marginal variable cost, if the inverse
of the elasticity of the dynamic actual variable cost function with respect
to dynamic cost e¢ ciency is not greater than dynamic cost ine¢ ciency (i.e., 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1  1   EFDi;t), then the GURP on the cost frontier is
not greater than the GURP on the actual cost minus the normalized price
ine¢ ciency (i.e., pGURAi;j;t  PIE i;j;t), and vice versa. In addition, if the sign
of normalized price ine¢ ciency is not negative (i.e., PIE i;j;t  0), then the
GURP on the cost frontier is not greater than the GURP on the actual cost.
2.2.4 EGLIs on the Cost Frontier and the Actual Cost
Similar to Homma (2009, 2012), the EGLIs on the cost frontier and the actual
cost can be derived using Eqs. (2.2.3.6) and (2.2.3.9), which represent the
relationship between the GURP on the cost frontier and dynamic frontier
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marginal variable cost, and Eqs. (2.2.3.7) and (2.2.3.10), which represent
the relationship between the GURP on the actual cost and the dynamic
actual marginal variable cost, respectively. More specically, dividing the
discrepancy between the SURP on the cost frontier and the dynamic frontier
marginal variable cost by the SURP on the cost frontier gives the EGLI on
the cost frontier. Similarly, dividing the discrepancy between the SURP on
the actual cost and the dynamic actual marginal variable cost by the SURP
on the actual cost gives the EGLI on the actual cost. The SURP on the
cost frontier is the price at which the market structure and conduct e¤ect
on the cost frontier, the equity capital e¤ect on the cost frontier, and the
risk-adjustment e¤ect on the cost frontier are assumed to be zero, so the
discrepancy between the SURP on the cost frontier and dynamic frontier
marginal variable cost equals the product of negative one and the sum of
these e¤ects. Similarly, the SURP on the actual cost is the price at which
the market structure and conduct e¤ect on the actual cost, the equity cap-
ital e¤ect on the actual cost, the risk-adjustment e¤ect on the actual cost,
and normalized price ine¢ ciency are assumed to be zero, so the discrepancy
between the SURP on actual cost and dynamic actual marginal variable cost
equals the sum of the normalized price ine¢ ciency and the product of neg-
ative one and the sum of these e¤ects. Where there is no dynamic cost
ine¢ ciency and no dynamic price ine¢ ciency, the EGLI on the actual cost
equals the EGLI on the cost frontier. In this subsection, the case of positive
SURPs on the cost frontier and the actual cost and the positive dynamic
frontier and actual marginal variable costs is considered with respect to the
relevant nancial good as an output.
The discrepancy between the SURP on the cost frontier and the dynamic
frontier marginal variable cost and the discrepancy between the SURP on
the actual cost and the dynamic actual marginal variable cost are expressed
in Remarks 4 and 5, respectively.
Remark 4 From Eqs. (2.2.3.6) and (2.2.3.9), the discrepancy between the
SURP on the cost frontier and the dynamic frontier marginal variable cost
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can be expressed as
pSURFi;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t =  
 
BPFi;j;t +MRS
BPF
e;i;t +$
BPF
i;j;t

=  bj  pG;t 

bC  i;j;t
1 + rFFi;t
+MRSFe;i;t +$
F
i;j;t

;
j = 1; :::; NA +NL. (2.2.4.1)
Remark 5 From Eqs. (2.2.3.7) and (2.2.3.10), the discrepancy between the
SURP on the actual cost and the dynamic actual marginal variable cost can
be expressed as
pSURAi;j;t  MCDAV i;j;t =  
 
BPAi;j;t +MRS
BPA
e;i;t +$
BPA
i;j;t

+ PIEi;j;t
=  bj  pG;t 

bC  i;j;t
1 + rFFi;t
+MRSAe;i;t +$
A
i;j;t

+ PIEi;j;t;
j = 1; :::; NA +NL. (2.2.4.2)
The EGLIs on the cost frontier and the actual cost are dened by dividing
both sides of Eqs. (2.2.4.1) and (2.2.4.2) by the SURPs on the cost frontier
and the actual cost, respectively.
Denition 14 (Extended Generalized-Lerner Index on the Cost Frontier)
The extended generalized-Lerner index on the cost frontier of the j-th nan-
cial good of the i-th nancial rm in period t, denoted by EGLIFi;j;t, is dened
as
EGLIFi;j;t =
pSURFi;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t
pSURFi;j;t
=  
BPF
i;j;t +MRS
BPF
e;i;t +$
BPF
i;j;t
pSURFi;j;t
=  bC  

i;j;t +
 
MRSFe;i;t +$
F
i;j;t
   1 + rFFi;t 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFFi;t
;
j = 1; :::; NA +NL. (2.2.4.3)
Denition 15 (Extended Generalized-Lerner Index on the Actual Cost)
The extended generalized-Lerner index on the actual cost of the j-th nancial
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good of the i-th nancial rm in period t, denoted by EGLIAi;j;t, is dened as
EGLIAi;j;t =
pSURAi;j;t  MCDAV i;j;t
pSURAi;j;t
=
PIEi;j;t  
 
BPAi;j;t +MRS
BPA
e;i;t +$
BPA
i;j;t

pSURAi;j;t
=
PIEi;j;t 
 
1 + rFAi;t
  bj  pG;t  bC  i;j;t +  MRSAe;i;t +$Ai;j;t   1 + rFAi;t 	
bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFAi;t
 ;
j = 1; :::; NA +NL. (2.2.4.4)
As similarly noted by Homma (2009, 2012), under the assumption that
the j-th nancial good is an output (i.e., pSURFi;j;t ,MC
DFV 
i;j;t , p
SURA
i;j;t ,MC
DAV 
i;j;t >
0), the signs of bC  hRi;j;t   rFFi;t and bC  hRi;j;t   rFAi;t are positive if the j-th
nancial good is a nancial asset other than cash, and negative if the j-th
nancial good is a liability. If the sign of i;j;t is determined by the sign of
the elasticity of the collected or paid interest rate of the SDEHRR or the
SDEHCR with respect to the total balance in the market, then the sign of
i;j;t is negative if the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset and positive
if the j-th nancial good is a liability.13 From Eqs. (2.2.3.1) and (2.2.3.2),
the signs of MRSFe;i;t and MRS
A
e;i;t are positive, and from Eqs. (2.2.3.4) and
(2.2.3.5), the signs of $Fi;j;t and $
A
i;j;t can be either positive or negative. From
the denitional identities of $Fi;j;t and $
A
i;j;t in Eqs. (2.2.3.3), (2.2.3.4), and
(2.2.3.5), if the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset and the risks (variances)
of quasi-short-run prots based on dynamic frontier cost and dynamic actual
cost increase due to an increase in the asset, then (cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QSF
i;t+1
 zi;t,
13If the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset (other than cash), then the elasticity of
the certain or predictable components of the SDEHRR with respect to the total balance in
the market (i.e., Qi;j;t; j = 2; :::; NA ) corresponds to the sum of the same elasticities of the
collected interest rate, the uncollected interest rate, and the service charge rate, minus the
same elasticity of the default rate. If the j-th nancial good is a liability, then the elasticity
of the certain or predictable components of the SDEHCR with respect to the total balance
in the market (i.e., Qi;j;t; j = NA + 1; :::; NA + NL) corresponds to the sum of the same
elasticities of the paid interest rate, the unpaid interest rate, and the insurance premium
rate, minus the same elasticity of the service charge rate. The sign of the elasticity of the
certain or predictable component of the collected interest rate with respect to the total
balance in the market is usually negative, and the sign of the same elasticity of the paid
interest rate is usually positive. However, the sign of the other elasticities can be positive
or negative.
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cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QSA
i;t+1
 zi;t > 0), and if the nancial rm is risk averse, the signs
of $Fi;j;t and $
A
i;j;t are negative, whereas if the risks (variances) of quasi-short-
run prots based on dynamic frontier cost and dynamic actual cost decrease,
then (cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QSF
i;t+1
 zi;t, cov i;j;t+1; QSAi;t+1  zi;t < 0), and if the -
nancial rm is still risk averse, the signs of $Fi;j;t and $
A
i;j;t are positive. On
the other hand, if the j-th nancial good is a liability and the risks (variances)
of quasi-short-run prots based on dynamic frontier cost and dynamic actual
cost increase due to an increase in the liability, then (cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QSF
i;t+1
 zi;t,
cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QSA
i;t+1
 zi;t < 0), and if the nancial rm is risk averse, the signs
of $Fi;j;t and $
A
i;j;t are positive, whereas if the risks (variances) of quasi-short-
run prots based on dynamic frontier cost and dynamic actual cost decrease,
then (cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QSF
i;t+1
 zi;t, cov i;j;t+1; QSAi;t+1  zi;t > 0), and if the nan-
cial rm is still risk averse, the signs of $Fi;j;t and $
A
i;j;t are negative. From
Eqs. (2.2.3.2), (2.2.3.5), and (2.2.3.10), the sign of PIE i;j;t can also be either
positive or negative. Under the assumption that the j-th nancial good is an
output, if the sign of PIE i;j;t is positive, then (MCDAV i;j;t < p
GURA
i;j;t ), and the
j-th nancial good is short, whereas if the sign of PIE i;j;t is negative, then
(MCDAV i;j;t > p
GURA
i;j;t ), and the j-th nancial good is over.
From Denitions 14 and 15, we can appreciate that the factors that have
an impact on the degree of competition are not those that a¤ect market
structure and conduct (i;j;t) from the perspective of conventional industrial
organization. From a nancial perspective, the risk-averse attitude of nan-
cial rms (rFFi;t , r
FA
i;t ), the uctuation risk of quasi-short-run prot ($
F
i;j;t,
$Ai;j;t), and the equity capital (which reects the risk of the burden of nancial
distress costs) (MRSFe;i;t , MRS
A
e;i;t ) also have an impact. Furthermore, from
a productive e¢ ciency perspective, the dynamic cost and price ine¢ ciencies
(1   EFDi;t , PIEi;j;t) also have an impact. Consequently, similar to Homma
(2012, Propositions 1 and 2), the following two propositions can be derived.
Proposition 2 If nancial rms are risk averse, an increase in equity capi-
tal increases the EGLIs of nancial assets other than cash on the cost frontier
and the actual cost (decreases the degree of competition) and decreases the
same EGLIs of liabilities (increases the degree of competition).
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Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in Homma (2012)
with the exception of replacingMRSe;i;t, u

i;t, 
QS
i;t , and r
F
i;t withMRS
F
e;i;t (or
MRSAe;i;t ), u
F
i;t (or u
A
i;t ), 
QSF
i;t (or 
QSA
i;t ), and r
FF
i;t (or r
FA
i;t ), respectively,
so we omit the derivation.
Proposition 3 Under the assumption that the risks (variances) of quasi-
short-run prots based on the dynamic frontier cost and the dynamic actual
cost increase due to an increase in nancial assets other than cash and liabil-
ities, if the nancial rm is risk averse, then the EGLIs on the cost frontier
and the actual cost increase (the degree of competition decreases), whereas if it
is assumed that the risks (variances) decrease, then the same EGLIs decrease
(the degree of competition increases) if the nancial rm is risk averse.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2 in Homma (2012)
with the exception of replacing $i;j;t and r
F
i;t with $
F
i;j;t (or $
A
i;j;t) and r
FF
i;t
(or rFAi;t ), respectively, so we omit the derivation.
From Denitions 14 and 15, using the EGLIs on the cost frontier and the
actual cost, the impact of dynamic cost and price ine¢ ciencies on the EGLI,
which was not considered in Homma (2009, 2012), can be dened.
Denition 16 (Impact of Ine¢ ciencies on the EGLI (IIEE)) The im-
pact of the dynamic cost and price ine¢ ciencies of the j-th nancial good of
the i-th nancial rm in period t on the EGLI, denoted by IIEEi;j;t, is dened
as
IIEEi;j;t = EGLI
F
i;j;t 
pSURAi;j;t
pSURFi;j;t
EGLIAi;j;t =
pSURFi;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t  
 
pSURAi;j;t  MCDAV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
=
 
BPAi;j;t   BPFi;j;t

+
 
MRSBPAe;i;t  MRSBPFe;i;t

+
 
$BPAi;j;t  $BPFi;j;t
  PIEi;j;t
pSURFi;j;t
;
j = 1; :::; NA +NL. (2.2.4.5)
From Denition 16, the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 4 If the nancial rm is risk averse and the dynamic fron-
tier variable cost function in period t+ 1 equals the dynamic actual variable
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cost function in period t + 1 (i.e., CDFV i;t+1 = C
DAV 
i;t+1 ) (hereafter Assumption
1), and if the inverse of the elasticity of the dynamic actual variable cost
function with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency is not greater than the dy-
namic cost ine¢ ciency (i.e.,
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1  1   EFDi;t) (hereafter
Assumption 2), and if the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset, or if the
j-th nancial good is a liability, the ratio of the subtraction of the certain
or predictable components of the SDEHCR from the reference rate on the
cost frontier to the subtraction of the certain or predictable components of
the SDEHCR from the reference rate on the actual cost (hereafter RH) is
not less than the ratio of the addition of one and the reference rate on the
cost frontier to the addition of one and the reference rate on the actual cost
(hereafter RR) (i.e., RHi;j;t =
 
rFFi;t   hRi;j;t
  
rFAi;t   hRi;j;t
  RRi;j;t = 
1 + rFFi;t
  
1 + rFAi;t

), and if Assumption 2 holds, then the IIEE is not
less than zero (i.e., IIEEi;j;t  0). Where dynamic cost and price ine¢ cien-
cies exist, the degree of competition can therefore be overestimated. How-
ever, under Assumption 1, if the j-th nancial good is a liability, the RH is
less than the RR (i.e., RHi;j;t =
 
rFFi;t   hRi;j;t
  
rFAi;t   hRi;j;t

< RRi;j;t = 
1 + rFFi;t
  
1 + rFAi;t

), and Assumption 2 holds, then the IIEE can be neg-
ative, zero, or positive.
Proof. FromDenitions 6 and 7, the dynamic actual variable cost function in
period t is not less than the dynamic frontier variable cost function in period
t (i.e., CDAV i;t  CDFV i;t ), so quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual
cost in period t is not greater than quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic
frontier cost in period t from Denitions 9 and 10 (i.e., QSAi;t  QSFi;t ). Fur-
thermore, if the nancial rm is risk averse, the marginal utility of the rm
with respect to quasi-short-run prot is a decreasing function of quasi-short-
run prot, so the marginal utility with respect to quasi-short-run prot based
on dynamic actual cost in period t is not less than the marginal utility with
respect to quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic frontier cost in period t
(i.e., @uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t  @uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t ). In this case, under the assumption
that the dynamic frontier variable cost function in period t + 1 equals the
dynamic actual variable cost function in period t+1 (i.e., CDFV i;t+1 = C
DAV 
i;t+1 ),
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from the denitions of the reference rates on the cost frontier and the actual
cost (i.e., rFFi;t = 1
.
E
h
i;t 

@uFi;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
.
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t

jzi;t
i
 
1 and rFAi;t = 1
.
E
h
i;t 

@uAi;t+1
.
@QSAi;t+1
.
@uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t

jzi;t
i
  1),
the reference rate on the actual cost is not less than the reference rate on
the cost frontier (i.e., rFAi;t  rFFi;t ) because quasi-short-run prot based
on dynamic actual cost in period t + 1 equals quasi-short-run prot based
on dynamic frontier cost in period t + 1 (i.e., QSAi;t+1 = 
QSF
i;t+1 ) and thus
the marginal utility with respect to quasi-short-run prot based on dy-
namic actual cost in period t + 1 equals the marginal utility with respect
to quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic frontier cost in period t + 1
(i.e., @uAi;t+1
.
@QSAi;t+1 = @u
F
i;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1 ). In this case, from the deni-
tions of the SURPs on the cost frontier and the actual cost (i.e., pSURFi;j;t =
bj pG;t
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFFi;t
  
1 + rFFi;t

and pSURAi;j;t = bj pG;t
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFAi;t
 
1 + rFAi;t

), if the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset (i.e., bj = 1) or
if the j-th nancial good is a liability (i.e., bj =  1) and the ratio of the
subtraction of the certain or predictable components of the SDEHCR from
the reference rate on the cost frontier to the subtraction of the certain or
predictable components of the SDEHCR from the reference rate on the ac-
tual cost (RH) is not less than the ratio of the addition of one and the
reference rate on the cost frontier to the addition of one and the reference
rate on the actual cost (RR) (i.e., RHi;j;t =
 
rFFi;t   hRi;j;t
  
rFAi;t   hRi;j;t
 
RRi;j;t =
 
1 + rFFi;t
  
1 + rFAi;t

), then the stochastic user-revenue price on
the actual cost is not greater than the stochastic user-revenue price on the
cost frontier (i.e., pSURAi;j;t  pSURFi;j;t ), whereas if the j-th nancial good is
a liability (i.e., bj =  1) and the RH is less than the RR (i.e., RHi;j;t = 
rFFi;t   hRi;j;t
  
rFAi;t   hRi;j;t

< RRi;j;t =
 
1 + rFFi;t
  
1 + rFAi;t

), then the
stochastic user-revenue price on the actual cost is greater than the stochas-
tic user-revenue price on the cost frontier (i.e., pSURAi;j;t > p
SURF
i;j;t ). Further-
more, from Proposition 1 (i.e.,MCDFV i;j;t =
n
EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1o
MCDAV i;j;t ), if the inverse of the elasticity of the dynamic actual variable cost
function with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency is not greater than the dy-
namic cost ine¢ ciency (i.e.,
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1  1 EFDi;t) (Assumption
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2), then dynamic actual marginal variable cost is not less than dynamic fron-
tier marginal variable cost (i.e., MCDAV i;j;t MCDFV i;j;t ). Consequently, under
Assumption 1, if the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset and Assumption
2 holds, or if the j-th nancial good is a liability, the RH is not less than the
RR, and Assumption 2 holds, then the discrepancy between the SURP on
the cost frontier and the dynamic frontier marginal variable cost is not less
than the discrepancy between the SURP on the actual cost and the dynamic
actual marginal variable cost (i.e., pSURFi;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t  pSURAi;j;t  MCDAV i;j;t ), so
the IIEE is not less than zero (i.e., IIEE i;j;t  0) because the sign of the
SURP on the cost frontier is positive under the assumption that the j-th
nancial good is an output (i.e., pSURFi;j;t , MC
DFV 
i;j;t , p
SURA
i;j;t , MC
DAV 
i;j;t > 0).
However, under Assumption 1, if the j-th nancial good is a liability, the RH
is less than the RR, and Assumption 2 holds, then the SURP on the actual
cost is greater than the SURP on the cost frontier (i.e., pSURAi;j;t > p
SURF
i;j;t )
and the dynamic actual marginal variable cost is not less than the dynamic
frontier marginal variable cost (i.e., MCDAV i;j;t MCDFV i;j;t ), so the IIEE can
be negative, zero, or positive.
Further, under the assumption that the j-th nancial good is an output
(i.e., pSURFi;j;t , MC
DFV 
i;j;t , p
SURA
i;j;t , MC
DAV 
i;j;t > 0), if the j-th nancial good is
a nancial asset, then the sign of the elasticity of the certain or predictable
components of the SDEHRR or the SDEHCR with respect to the j-th nan-
cial good is negative (i.e., i;j;t < 0), whereas if the j-th nancial good is
a liability, then the sign of this elasticity is positive (i.e., i;j;t > 0). From
the denitions of market structure and conduct e¤ects based on the cost
frontier and the actual cost (i.e., BPFi;j;t = bj  pG;t  bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFFi;t

and BPAi;j;t = bj  pG;t  bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFAi;t

), the signs of these e¤ects are,
therefore, negative (i.e., BPFi;j;t , 
BPA
i;j;t < 0). Furthermore, from the proof
of Proposition 4, under Assumption 1, the reference rate on the actual cost
is not less than the reference rate on the cost frontier (i.e., rFAi;t  rFFi;t ),
so the market structure and conduct e¤ect based on actual cost is not less
than the market structure and conduct e¤ect based on the cost frontier (i.e.,
BPAi;j;t  BPFi;j;t ).
From the denition of the marginal rate of substitution of quasi-short-run
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prot based on the dynamic actual cost for equity capital (i.e., MRSAe;i;t = 
@uAi;t

@qpe;i;t
.
@uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t

), the following equation holds:
@MRSAe;i;t
@QSAi;t
=
 
@uAi;t
@QSAi;t
! 1

 
@2uAi;t
@QSAi;t @q
p
e;i;t
 MRSAe;i;t 
@2uAi;t
@QSA2i;t
!
.
(2.2.4.6)
The signs of the marginal utility of the nancial rm with respect to quasi-
short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost and the marginal utility of the
nancial rm with respect to equity capital are positive (i.e., @uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t ,
@uAi;t

@qpe;i;t > 0), so the sign of the marginal rate of substitution of quasi-
short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost for equity capital is also pos-
itive (i.e., MRSAe;i;t > 0). If the nancial rm is risk averse, the marginal
utility of the nancial rm with respect to quasi-short-run prot is a decreas-
ing function of quasi-short-run prot, so the sign of the second-order partial
derivative of the utility of the nancial rm with respect to quasi-short-run
prot based on dynamic actual cost is negative (i.e., @2uAi;t
.
@QSA2i;t < 0).
If the relationship between quasi-short-run prot and equity capital is, there-
fore, complementary (i.e., @2uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t @q
p
e;i;t > 0), or if this relation-
ship is substitutive (i.e., @2uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t @q
p
e;i;t < 0) and the absolute value
of the cross partial derivative of the utility of the nancial rm with re-
spect to quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost and equity
capital is less than the product of the negative marginal rate of substi-
tution of quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost for equity
capital and the second-order partial derivative of the utility of the nan-
cial rm with respect to quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual
cost (i.e.,
@2uAi;t .@QSAi;t @qpe;i;t  <  MRSAe;i;t  @2uAi;t .@QSA2i;t ), then the
sign of the partial derivative of the marginal rate of substitution of quasi-
short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost for equity capital with re-
spect to quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost is positive
(i.e., @MRSAe;i;t

@QSAi;t > 0). Thus the marginal rate of substitution of
quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost for equity capital is
greater than the marginal rate of substitution of quasi-short-run prot based
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on the dynamic actual cost for equity capital (i.e., MRSFe;i;t >MRS
A
e;i;t ) be-
cause quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost is not greater than
quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost from Denitions
9 and 10 (i.e., QSAi;t  QSFi;t ). Thus, from the denitions of equity cap-
ital e¤ects based on the cost frontier and the actual cost (i.e., MRSBPFe;i;t
= bj  pG;tMRSFe;i;t and MRSBPAe;i;t = bj  pG;tMRSAe;i;t ), if the j-th nancial
good is a nancial asset (i.e., bj = 1), then the equity capital e¤ects based
on the cost frontier are greater than the equity capital e¤ects based on the
actual cost (i.e., MRSBPFe;i;t >MRS
BPA
e;i;t ), whereas if the j-th nancial good
is a liability (i.e., bj =  1), then the equity capital e¤ects based on the cost
frontier are less than the equity capital e¤ects based on the actual cost (i.e.,
MRSBPFe;i;t <MRS
BPA
e;i;t ). However, if the relationship between quasi-short-
run prot and equity capital is substitutive (i.e., @2uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t @q
p
e;i;t < 0)
and the absolute value of the cross partial derivative of the utility of the
nancial rm with respect to quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual
cost and equity capital is greater than the product of the negative marginal
rate of substitution of quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost
for equity capital and the second-order partial derivative of the utility of
the nancial rm with respect to quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic
actual cost (i.e.,
@2uAi;t .@QSAi;t @qpe;i;t  >  MRSAe;i;t  @2uAi;t .@QSA2i;t ), the
sign of the partial derivative of the marginal rate of substitution of quasi-
short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost for equity capital with re-
spect to quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost is negative (i.e.,
@MRSAe;i;t

@QSAi;t < 0). The marginal rate of substitution of quasi-short-
run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost for equity capital is therefore
less than the marginal rate of substitution of quasi-short-run prot based
on the dynamic actual cost for equity capital (i.e., MRSFe;i;t <MRS
A
e;i;t ). In
this case, if the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset, then the equity cap-
ital e¤ect based on the cost frontier is less than the equity capital e¤ect
based on actual cost (i.e., MRSBPFe;i;t <MRS
BPA
e;i;t ), whereas if the j-th -
nancial good is a liability, then the equity capital e¤ect based on the cost
frontier is greater than the equity capital e¤ect based on actual cost (i.e.,
MRSBPFe;i;t >MRS
BPA
e;i;t ).
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From the proof of Proposition 4, under Assumption 1, the marginal utility
of quasi-short-run prot based on dynamic actual cost in period t is not less
than the marginal utility of quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic fron-
tier cost in period t (i.e., @uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t  @uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t ) and the marginal
utility of quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic actual cost in period
t+1 equals the marginal utility of quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic
frontier cost in period t+1 (i.e., @uAi;t+1
.
@QSAi;t+1 = @u
F
i;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1 ). From
the denition of the risk-adjustment e¤ects based on the cost frontier and
the actual cost (i.e., $BPFi;j;t = bj pG;t i;tcov

 i;j;t+1; @u
F
i;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
 zi;t.
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t

and$BPAi;j;t = bjpG;ti;tcov

 i;j;t+1; @u
A
i;t+1
.
@QSAi;t+1
 zi;t.
@uAi;t
.
@QSAi;t

), the absolute value of the risk-adjustment e¤ect based
on the cost frontier is, therefore, not less than the absolute value of the risk-
adjustment e¤ect based on the actual cost (i.e.,
$BPFi;j;t   $BPAi;j;t ) because
the covariance of uncertain components of the SDEHRR and the SDEHCR
with respect to the marginal utility of quasi-short-run prot based on the
dynamic frontier cost in period t+1 equals the covariance of the same uncer-
tain components with respect to the marginal utility of quasi-short-run prot
based on dynamic actual cost in period t+1 (i.e., cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
F
i;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1
 zi;t
=cov

 i;j;t+1; @u
A
i;t+1
.
@QSAi;t+1
 zi;t). Consequently, if dynamic cost ine¢ -
ciency exists, the impact of the risk-adjustment e¤ect can be underestimated.
As noted above, under the assumption that the j-th nancial good is
an output, if the sign of PIE i;j;t is positive, then (MCDAV i;j;t < p
GURA
i;j;t ), the
j-th nancial good is short, whereas if the sign of PIE i;j;t is negative, then
(MCDAV i;j;t > p
GURA
i;j;t ), the j-th nancial good is over. In these cases, the sign
of the IIEE is ambiguous because the market structure and conduct e¤ect, the
equity capital e¤ect, and the risk-adjustment e¤ect are also simultaneously
a¤ected.
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3 Mathematical Formulations and Theoreti-
cal Interpretations of the E¢ cient Struc-
ture and Quiet-Life Hypotheses
This section formulates the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses on
the basis of the extended GURM that accounts for dynamic cost e¢ ciency.
In terms of the former, three formulations are possible. The rst is that the
e¢ cient structure hypothesis is expressed by the e¤ect of the improvement
in dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the previous period on the planned optimal
nancial good in the current period, so it is a direct denition of the e¢ -
cient structure hypothesis. The second formulation involves expressing the
e¢ cient structure hypothesis by the ratio of the following two sums, and pro-
vides the foundation for rigorous theoretical interpretations: the numerator
is the sum of the net e¤ect of the improvement in dynamic cost e¢ ciency
in the previous period and the e¤ect of the same improvement. The former
net e¤ect is on the GURP on the cost frontier (i.e., the dynamic frontier
marginal variable cost with respect to the planned optimal nancial good)
in the current period and on the dynamic actual marginal variable cost with
respect to the planned optimal nancial good in the current period. This net
e¤ect is normalized by the same dynamic actual marginal variable cost and
accounts for the correction in dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current
period (as discussed below). The latter e¤ect is on the elasticity of the dy-
namic actual variable cost in the current period with respect to dynamic cost
e¢ ciency in the current period. This e¤ect is normalized by the square of the
same elasticity. Similarly, the denominator is the sum of the net e¤ect of an
increase in the planned optimal nancial good in the current period and the
e¤ect of the same increase in the planned optimal nancial good. Similar to
the numerator, the former net e¤ect is on the same GURP and on the same
dynamic actual marginal variable cost. This net e¤ect is normalized by the
same dynamic actual marginal variable cost and accounts for the correction
in dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current period. The latter e¤ect
is on the same elasticity of dynamic actual variable cost and is normalized
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by the square of the same elasticity. The third formulation is that the net
e¤ect in the numerator of the second formulation is expressed by the sum
of the e¤ects of the improvement in dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the previous
period on the e¢ ciency di¤erence of the GURP of the planned optimal nan-
cial good in the current period, the pricing error of the same nancial good,
and dynamic actual marginal variable cost with respect to the same nancial
good, which is corrected by dynamic marginal cost ine¢ ciency in the current
period. Similar to the numerator, the net e¤ect in the denominator of the
second formulation is expressed by the sum of the e¤ects of an increase in
the planned optimal nancial good in the current period on the same fac-
tors as the numerator. This formulation is, therefore, used to extensively
interpret the e¢ cient structure hypothesis with these e¤ects. Similarly, in
terms of the quiet-life hypothesis, three formulations are also possible. The
rst is that the quiet-life hypothesis is expressed by the e¤ect of an increase
in the Herndahl index in the previous period on dynamic cost e¢ ciency in
the current period, so it is a direct denition of the quiet-life hypothesis.
The second formulation is that the quiet-life hypothesis is expressed by the
following ratio, so it provides the foundation for rigorous theoretical inter-
pretations: the numerator is the sum of the net e¤ect of the same increase
in the Herndahl index and the e¤ect of the same increase. Similar to the
e¢ cient structure hypothesis, the former net e¤ect is on the same GURP
and on the same dynamic actual marginal variable cost. This net e¤ect is
normalized by the same dynamic actual marginal variable cost and accounts
for the same correction in dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency. The latter e¤ect
is on the same elasticity of dynamic actual variable cost, and is normalized
by the same square of the same elasticity. The denominator is the product of
the same dynamic actual marginal variable cost as per the e¢ cient structure
hypothesis and the same square of the same elasticity. The third formulation
is that the same net e¤ect in the second formulation is expressed by the sum
of the e¤ects of the same increase in the Herndahl index on the same e¢ -
ciency di¤erence of the GURP as per the e¢ cient structure hypothesis, the
same pricing error, and the same corrected dynamic actual marginal variable
cost, so it is the formulation that is used to extensively interpret the quiet-life
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hypothesis with these e¤ects.
3.1 Mathematical Formulations and Theoretical Inter-
pretations of the E¢ cient Structure Hypothesis
As already noted, the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is a composite that sug-
gests three stages of causal relations from rm e¢ ciency to rm growth (i.e.,
the rst stage), then to market structure (i.e., the second stage), and nally to
market performance (i.e., the third stage). There is no scope for improving on
Demsetz (1973) vis-à-vis the rst stage causality from rm e¢ ciency to rm
growth. As noted by Homma et al. ( 2014), this rst stage causality is the
fundamental feature of the e¢ cient structure hypothesis, so this paper also
regards this causality as the e¢ cient structure hypothesis. Specically, by
regarding rm e¢ ciency as dynamic cost e¢ ciency, and by considering rm
growth as an increase in a nancial good (e.g., a loan), this section endeav-
ors to rigorously formulate and theoretically interpret the e¢ cient structure
hypothesis.
Denition 17 (Acceptance of the E¢ cient Structure Hypothesis) If
the planned optimal nancial good (e.g., the planned optimal loan) in the
current period increases because of improved dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the
previous period, then the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is accepted. Speci-
cally, if the sign of @qpi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 is positive (i.e., @q
p
i;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 > 0),
then the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is accepted.
From this denition, the following two propositions are derived.
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Proposition 5 @qpi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 is expressed as follows:
@qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
=
2424 @pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
#,2424@pGURFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@qpi;j;t
35

 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
35 , (3.1.1)
where @pGURFi;j;t /@X (X = EF
D
i;t 1 or q
p
i;j;t) is expressed as
@pGURFi;j;t
@X
=
@pSURFi;j;t
@X
+
@BPFi;j;t
@X
+
@MRSBPFe;i;t
@X
+
@$BPFi;j;t
@X
. (3.1.2)
Proof. Partial di¤erentiation of both sides of Eq. (2.2.3.9) with respect to
the j-th planned optimal nancial good in the current period gives
@MCDFV i;j;t
@qpi;j;t
=
@pGURFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
. (P5.1)
Similarly, partial di¤erentiation of both sides of Eq. (2.1.11.1) with respect
to the j-th planned optimal nancial good in the current period gives
@MCDFV i;j;t
@qpi;j;t
=
8<:@EFDi;t@qpi;j;t  
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 2
 @
2 lnCDAVi;t
@qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
9=; MCDAV i;j;t
+
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@qpi;j;t . (P5.2)
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Substituting Eq. (P5.2) for the left-hand side of Eq. (P5.1) gives8<:@EFDi;t@qpi;j;t  
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 2
 @
2 lnCDAVi;t
@qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
9=; MCDAV i;j;t
+
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@qpi;j;t = @p
GURF
i;j;t
@qpi;j;t
. (P5.3)
Transforming Eq. (P5.3) with respect to @EFDi;t

@qpi;j;t and then rearranging
gives
@EFDi;t
@qpi;j;t
=
2424@pGURFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@qpi;j;t
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
#,8<:MCDAV i;j;t 
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!29=; . (P5.4)
From this equation, @qpi;j;t

@EFDi;t is expressed as follows:
@qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t
=
8<:MCDAV i;j;t 
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!29=;,2424@pGURFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@qpi;j;t
35

 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
35 . (P5.5)
Similar to Eq. (P5.1), partial di¤erentiation of both sides of Eq. (2.2.3.9)
with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the previous period gives
@MCDFV i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
=
@pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
. (P5.6)
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Similar to Eq. (P5.2), partial di¤erentiation of both sides of Eq. (2.1.11.1)
with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the previous period gives
@MCDFV i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
=
8<: @EFDi;t@EFDi;t 1  
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 2
 @
2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
9=; MCDAV i;j;t
+
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1 . (P5.7)
Similar to Eq. (P5.3), substituting Eq. (P5.7) for the left-hand side of Eq.
(P5.6) gives8<: @EFDi;t@EFDi;t 1  
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 2
 @
2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
9=; MCDAV i;j;t
+
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1 = @p
GURF
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
. (P5.8)
Similar to Eq. (P5.4), transforming Eq. (P5.8) with respect to @EFDi;t

@EFDi;t 1
and then rearranging gives
@EFDi;t
@EFDi;t 1
=
2424 @pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
#,8<:MCDAV i;j;t 
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!29=; . (P5.9)
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From Eqs. (P5.5) and (P5.9), @qpi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 is expressed as follows:
@qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
=
@qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t
 @EF
D
i;t
@EFDi;t 1
=
2424 @pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
#,2424@pGURFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@qpi;j;t
35

 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
35 ,
where, from Eq. (2.2.3.6), @pGURFi;j;t /@X (X = EF
D
i;t 1 or q
p
i;j;t) is expressed
as
@pGURFi;j;t
@X
=
@pSURFi;j;t
@X
+
@BPFi;j;t
@X
+
@MRSBPFe;i;t
@X
+
@$BPFi;j;t
@X
.
@pGURFi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 in Eq. (3.1.1) is the e¤ect of the improvement in dy-
namic cost e¢ ciency in the previous period on the GURP of the j-th planned
optimal nancial good on the cost frontier (i.e., the dynamic frontier marginal
variable cost with respect to the j-th planned optimal nancial good) in the
current period.
n
EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1o
(= MCDFV i;j;t

MCDAV i;j;t =
pGURFi;j;t

MCDAV i;j;t ) in Eq. (3.1.1) is the dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency
that can be interpreted as a coe¢ cient quantifying the di¤erential shapes
of the dynamic frontier variable cost function and the dynamic actual vari-
able cost function. If both shapes are perfectly equal (i.e., MCDFV i;j;t (=
pGURFi;j;t )=MC
DAV 
i;j;t ), then the following equation holds:n
EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1o
= 1. However, for example, if the dy-
namic actual variable cost function is an increasing homothetic function of
the dynamic frontier variable cost function (i.e., both shapes are not very dif-
ferent), then the following inequality holds: MCDFV i;j;t (= p
GURF
i;j;t )MCDAV i;j;t .
Further, this inequality also holds:
n
EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1o  1.
In this case, dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency can be interpreted as a dis-
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count factor. In contrast, if both shapes are very di¤erent (for example,
the dynamic frontier variable cost function has no area where the mar-
ginal cost decreases, whereas the dynamic actual variable cost function has
an area where the marginal cost decreases), then this inequality can hold:
MCDFV i;j;t (= p
GURF
i;j;t )>MC
DAV 
i;j;t . Further, this inequality would also hold:n
EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1o
> 1. In this case, dynamic marginal cost
e¢ ciency can be interpreted as an extra factor. Consequently,
 
n
EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1o @MCDAV i;j;t @EFDi;t 1 in Eq. (3.1.1) can
be interpreted as the decreasing e¤ect of the improvement in dynamic cost ef-
ciency in the previous period on dynamic actual marginal variable cost with
respect to the j-th planned optimal nancial good in the current period (i.e.,
 @MCDAV i;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 ), which is corrected by dynamic marginal cost e¢ -
ciency in the current period (i.e.,
n
EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1o
). Con-
sidering the case that both shapes are perfectly equal (i.e.,n
EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1o
= 1) as a criterion for interpreting dy-
namic marginal cost e¢ ciency, if the dynamic actual variable cost function
is an increasing homothetic function of the dynamic frontier variable cost
function (i.e., both shapes are not very di¤erent), then this decreasing ef-
fect is evaluated at a discount, whereas if this dynamic actual variable cost
function is not an increasing homothetic function (i.e., both shapes are very
di¤erent), then this decreasing e¤ect is evaluated at an extra. Without this
correction, the former case overestimates this decreasing e¤ect, whereas the
latter case underestimates it. Specically, in order to compare these cases,
it is assumed that, following an improvement in dynamic cost e¢ ciency in
the previous period, dynamic actual marginal variable costs with respect
to the j-th planned optimal nancial good in the current period are equal
where dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciencies in the current period are one and
other than one. If dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current period
is less than one, then the decreasing e¤ect (in terms of absolute value) is
greater than in the case that this dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency is one
(i.e.,  @MCDAV i;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 =  @MCDFV i;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 ), whereas if this dy-
namic marginal cost e¢ ciency is greater than one, then the decreasing e¤ect
(in terms of absolute value) is less than in the case that this dynamic mar-
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ginal cost e¢ ciency is one. If taking this dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency to
be one as a criterion, the need to correct this decreasing e¤ect by multiply-
ing by this dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency, therefore, arises. Consequently,
@pGURFi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1  
n
EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
 1o @MCDAV i;j;t @EFDi;t 1
in Eq. (3.1.1) can be concisely interpreted as the net e¤ect of the improve-
ment in dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the previous period on the GURP of the
j-th planned optimal nancial good on the cost frontier in the current pe-
riod and on the dynamic actual marginal variable cost with respect to the
same planned optimal nancial good in the current period, which accounts
for the correction in dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current period
(hereafter the net e¤ect). In addition, @2 lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t in Eq.
(3.1.1) can be interpreted as the e¤ect of the same improvement in dynamic
cost e¢ ciency on the elasticity of dynamic actual variable cost in the cur-
rent period with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the current period
(hereafter the e¤ect on the elasticity). The remainder of Eq. (3.1.1), 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
2
, and MCDAV i;j;t can be interpreted as coe¢ cients con-
necting the net e¤ect and the e¤ect on the elasticity, which use the product
of these coe¢ cients as a common criterion (i.e., denominator). From the
proof of Proposition 5, the net e¤ect is based on MCDAV i;j;t and the e¤ect on
the elasticity is based on
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
2
, so the need to multiply these
coe¢ cients in order to connect these e¤ects based on the product of these
coe¢ cients arises. Generally speaking, the numerator of Eq. (3.1.1) can be
interpreted as the sum of the net e¤ect based on MCDAV i;j;t and the e¤ect on
the elasticity, which is based on
 
@ lnCDAVi;t

@EFDi;t
2
. For the denominator
of Eq. (3.1.1), the interpretation is similar to that of the numerator of Eq.
(3.1.1) with the exception of replacing EFDi;t 1 with q
p
i;j;t. The denominator is
the sum of the net e¤ect of an increase in the j-th planned optimal nancial
good in the current period and the e¤ect of the same increase in the j-th
planned optimal nancial good. Similar to the numerator, the former net ef-
fect is on the same GURP and on the same dynamic actual marginal variable
cost. This net e¤ect is normalized by the same dynamic actual marginal vari-
able cost and accounts for the correction in dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency
in the current period. The latter e¤ect is on the same elasticity of dynamic
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actual variable cost and is normalized by the square of the same elasticity.
Consequently, if both the numerator and denominator are simultaneously
positive or negative, then the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is accepted.
Proposition 6 @qpi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 is, furthermore, expressed as follows:
@qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
=
24Ai;j;t  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
35
,24Bi;j;t  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
35 , (3.1.3)
where Ai;j;t and Bi;j;t are respectively expressed as follows:
Ai;j;t =
 
@pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
  @p
GURA
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
!
+
@PIEi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
+
@MCDAV i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 MC
DAV 
i;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t
MCDAV i;j;t
, (3.1.4)
Bi;j;t =
 
@pGURFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
  @p
GURA
i;j;t
@qpi;j;t
!
+
@PIEi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
+
@MCDAV i;j;t
@qpi;j;t
 MC
DAV 
i;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t
MCDAV i;j;t
. (3.1.5)
Proof. From Proposition 5 (Eq. (3.1.1)), Ai;j;t is initially expressed as
follows:
Ai;j;t =
@pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1 . (P6.1)
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Rearranging this equation then gives
Ai;j;t =
@pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1
=
 
@pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
  @p
GURA
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
!
+
 
@pGURAi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
  @MC
DAV 
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
!
+
@MCDAV i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1

241 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;
35 . (P6.2)
FromRemark 2 (Eq. (2.2.3.10)), the second term in this equation is expressed
as follows:
@pGURAi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
  @MC
DAV 
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
=
@PIE i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
. (P6.3)
From Proposition 1 (Eq. (2.1.11.1)), the third term in the same equation is
expressed as follows:
@MCDAV i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1

241 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;
35 = @MCDAV i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1

 
1  MC
DFV 
i;j;t
MCDAV i;j;t
!
=
@MCDAV i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 MC
DAV 
i;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t
MCDAV i;j;t
. (P6.4)
Substituting Eqs. (P6.3) and (P6.4) into Eq. (P6.2) then gives
Ai;j;t =
 
@pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
  @p
GURA
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
!
+
@PIE i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
+
@MCDAV i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
MC
DAV 
i;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t
MCDAV i;j;t
.
The derivation of Bi;j;t (Eq. (3.1.5)) is similar to the derivation of Ai;j;t (Eq.
(3.1.4)) with the exception of replacing EFDi;t 1 with q
p
i;j;t, so we omit the
derivation.
From Proposition 6, the net e¤ect of the improvement in dynamic cost
e¢ ciency in the previous period on the GURP of the j-th planned optimal
nancial good on the cost frontier in the current period and on the dynamic
actual marginal variable cost with respect to the same planned optimal nan-
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cial good in the current period, which accounts for the correction in dynamic
marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current period, can be expressed as the sum
of the e¤ects of the improvement in dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the previous
period on the e¢ ciency di¤erence of the GURP of the j-th planned opti-
mal nancial good in the current period (i.e., pGURFi;j;t   pGURAi;j;t ), the pricing
error of the same nancial good (i.e., PIE i;j;t (= pGURAi;j;t  MCDAV i;j;t )), and
the dynamic actual marginal variable cost with respect to the same nancial
good (i.e., MCDAV i;j;t ), which accounts for the correction in dynamic marginal
cost e¢ ciency in the current period (i.e.,
 
MCDAV i;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t

MCDAV i;j;t ).
Regarding the net e¤ect of an increase in the j-th planned optimal nan-
cial good in the current period, the expression is similar to the net e¤ect of
the improvement in dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the previous period with the
exception of replacing EFDi;t 1 with q
p
i;j;t.
3.2 Mathematical Formulations and Theoretical Inter-
pretations of the Quiet-Life Hypothesis
As already noted, the quiet-life hypothesis concerns the relationship between
market concentration and rm e¢ ciency. Similar to Homma et al. ( 2014), by
regarding this as the relationship between the Herndahl index and dynamic
cost e¢ ciency, this section endeavors to rigorously formulate and theoretically
interpret this hypothesis.
Denition 18 (Acceptance of the Quiet-Life Hypothesis) If dynamic
cost e¢ ciency in the current period decreases because of an increase in the
Herndahl index in the previous period, then the quiet-life hypothesis is ac-
cepted. Specically, if the sign of @EFDi;t /@HIj;t 1 is negative (i.e.,
@EFDi;t /@HIj;t 1 < 0), then the quiet-life hypothesis is accepted.
Similar to Denition 17, from this denition, the following two proposi-
tions are derived.
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Proposition 7 @EFDi;t /@HIj;t 1 is expressed as follows:
@EFDi;t
@HIj;t 1
=
2424 @pGURFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@HIj;t 1
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@HIj;t 1@EFDi;t
#,8<:MCDAV i;j;t 
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!29=; , (3.2.1)
where @pGURFi;j;t /@HIj;t 1 is expressed as
@pGURFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
=
@pSURFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
+
@BPFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
+
@MRSBPFe;i;t
@HIj;t 1
+
@$BPFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
. (3.2.2)
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to Eq. (P5.9) in the proof
of Proposition 5 with the exception of replacing EFDi;t 1 with HIj;t 1, so we
omit the derivation.
The interpretation of Eq. (3.2.1) in Proposition 7 is similar to the numer-
ator of Eq. (3.1.1) in Proposition 5 with the exception of replacing EFDi;t 1
with HIj;t 1. Eq. (3.2.1) is the sum of the net e¤ect of an increase in the
Herndahl index in the previous period and the e¤ect of the same increase
in the Herndahl index. Similar to the numerator of Eq. (3.1.1) in Propo-
sition 5, the former net e¤ect is on the GURP of the j-th planned optimal
nancial good on the cost frontier in the current period and on the dynamic
actual marginal variable cost with respect to the same planned optimal -
nancial good in the current period. This net e¤ect is normalized by the
same dynamic actual marginal variable cost and accounts for the correction
in dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current period. The latter e¤ect
is on the elasticity of dynamic actual variable cost in the current period
with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the current period and is normal-
ized by the square of the same elasticity. Under the assumption that the
j-th nancial good is an output (i.e., pSURFi;j;t , MC
DFV 
i;j;t > 0) and the sign
of dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current period is positive (i.e.,
MCDFV i;j;t

MCDAV i;j;t > 0), if the numerator of Eq. (3.2.1) in Proposition 7 is
negative, then the quiet-life hypothesis is accepted.
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Proposition 8 @EFDi;t /@HIj;t 1 is, furthermore, expressed as follows:
@EFDi;t
@HIj;t 1
=
24Ai;j;t  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@HIj;t 1@EFDi;t
35
,8<:MCDAV i;j;t 
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!29=; , (3.2.3)
where Ai;j;t is expressed as
Ai;j;t =
 
@pGURFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
  @p
GURA
i;j;t
@HIj;t 1
!
+
@PIEi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
+
@MCDAV i;j;t
@HIj;t 1
 MC
DAV 
i;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t
MCDAV i;j;t
. (3.2.4)
Proof. The derivation of Ai;j;t (Eq. (3.2.4)) is similar to the derivation of
Ai;j;t in Eq. (3.1.4) of Proposition 6 with the exception of replacing EFDi;t 1
with HIj;t 1, so we omit the derivation.
The interpretation of Ai;j;t (Eq. (3.2.4)) is similar to the interpretation of
Ai;j;t in Eq. (3.1.4) of Proposition 6 with the exception of replacing EFDi;t 1
with HIj;t 1. The net e¤ect of an increase in the Herndahl index in the
previous period on the GURP of the j-th planned optimal nancial good
on the cost frontier in the current period and on dynamic actual marginal
variable cost with respect to the same planned optimal nancial good in the
current period, which accounts for the correction in dynamic marginal cost
e¢ ciency in the current period, can be expressed as the sum of the e¤ects of
an increase in the Herndahl index in the previous period on the e¢ ciency
di¤erence of the GURP of the j-th planned optimal nancial good in the
current period (i.e., pGURFi;j;t   pGURAi;j;t ), the pricing error of the same nan-
cial good (i.e., PIE i;j;t (= pGURAi;j;t  MCDAV i;j;t )), and dynamic actual marginal
variable cost with respect to the same nancial good (i.e., MCDAV i;j;t ), which
accounts for the correction in dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current
period (i.e.,
 
MCDAV i;j;t  MCDFV i;j;t

MCDAV i;j;t ).
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4 Relative Magnitude of the E¢ cient Struc-
ture Hypothesis to the Quiet-Life Hypoth-
esis
This section denes the relative magnitude of the e¢ cient structure hypothe-
sis to the quiet-life hypothesis and claries the condition whereby the former
is superior (or inferior) in magnitude to the latter. As already noted, if a
criterion for judging industrial organization policies is that support for both
hypotheses should be associated with increased EGLI on the cost frontier,
then anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies are necessary if the quiet-
life hypothesis is superior in magnitude to the e¢ cient structure hypothesis.
If the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is, however, superior in magnitude to the
quiet-life hypothesis, then new industrial organization policies which di¤er
from existing anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies, and in which
an e¢ ciency improvement would decrease the EGLI on the cost frontier, are
needed. Consequently, from the perspective of industrial organization and
anti-monopoly policies, it is important to clarify which of these hypotheses
are superior, because this determines the recommended policy interventions.
Denition 19 (Relative Magnitude) The relative magnitude of the e¢ -
cient structure hypothesis to the quiet-life hypothesis, denoted by RMi;j;t, is
dened as follows:
RMi;j;t =
@ ln qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1

@EFDi;t
@ lnHIj;t 1
. (4.1)
RMi;j;t is the ratio of the elasticity of the j-th planned optimal nancial
good in the current period with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the
previous period to the elasticity of dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the current
period with respect to the Herndahl index in the previous period. From
this denition and Propositions 5 and 7, the following proposition holds.
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Proposition 9 RMi;j;t is expressed as follows:
RMi;j;t =
242424 @pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1
35

 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
35 
8<:MCDAV i;j;t 
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!29=;
35
,242424@pGURFi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@ ln qpi;j;t
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@ ln qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
#

2424 @pGURFi;j;t
@ lnHIj;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;
 @MC
DAV 
i;j;t
@ lnHIj;t 1
#

 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@ lnHIj;t 1@EFDi;t
3535 . (4.2)
Proof. From Denition 19 and Proposition 5, the numerator of RMi;j;t is
expressed as follows:
@ ln qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
=
@qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 1
qpi;j;t
=
2424 @pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
#,2424@pGURFi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;
@MC
DAV 
i;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
#

 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@ ln qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
35 . (P9.1)
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Similarly, from Denition 19 and Proposition 7, the denominator of RMi;j;t
is expressed as follows:
@EFDi;t
@ lnHIj;t 1
=
@EFDi;t
@HIj;t 1
HIj;t 1
=
2424 @pGURFi;j;t
@ lnHIj;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@ lnHIj;t 1
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@ lnHIj;t 1@EFDi;t
#,8<:MCDAV i;j;t 
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!29=; . (P9.2)
Substituting Eqs. (P9.1) and (P9.2) into Eq. (4.1) then yields Eq. (4.2).
From Proposition 9, the following proposition is then established.
Proposition 10 Considering CMi;j;t as a criterion, if dynamic actual mar-
ginal variable cost with respect to the j-th planned optimal nancial good in
the current period is less than CMi;j;t (i.e., MCDAV i;j;t < CMi;j;t), then the e¢ -
cient structure hypothesis is superior in magnitude to the quiet-life hypothesis,
whereas if the same dynamic actual marginal variable cost is greater than the
same criterion (i.e., MCDAV i;j;t > CMi;j;t), then the quiet-life hypothesis is su-
perior in magnitude to the e¢ cient structure hypothesis, where CMi;j;t is as
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follows:
CMi;j;t =  
2424@pGURFi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@ ln qpi;j;t
35

 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@ ln qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
35  "" @pGURFi;j;t
@ lnHIj;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@ lnHIj;t 1
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@ lnHIj;t 1@EFDi;t
#,242424 @pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;
@MC
DAV 
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
#

 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!235 .
(4.3)
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Proof. From Proposition 9 (Eq. (4.2)), the following relations between
inequalities hold:
RMi;j;t =
@ ln qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1

@EFDi;t
@ lnHIj;t 1
< ( > , = )  1
()
2424 @pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
#

8<:MCDAV i;j;t 
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!29=;
< ( > , = ) 
2424@pGURFi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@ ln qpi;j;t
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
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@EFDi;t
!2
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@2 lnCDAVi;t
@ ln qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
35  "" @pGURFi;j;t
@ lnHIj;t 1
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8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@ lnHIj;t 1
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@ lnHIj;t 1@EFDi;t
#
() MCDAV i;j;t < ( > , = ) 
2424@pGURFi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@ ln qpi;j;t
35

 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@ ln qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
35  "" @pGURFi;j;t
@ lnHIj;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@ lnHIj;t 1
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@ lnHIj;t 1@EFDi;t
#,242424 @pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
 
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;
@MC
DAV 
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
#

 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
+MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
35  @ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!235
( = CMi;j;t).
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5 E¢ cient Structure and Quiet-Life Hypothe-
ses and the EGLI on the Cost Frontier
This section claries under what assumptions either or both the e¢ cient
structure and quiet life hypotheses increase or decrease the EGLI on the
cost frontier and considers the implications thereof. Results suggest that
both desirable and undesirable cases exist, and the following two points are
particularly noteworthy: (1) it is not always possible to justify anti-monopoly
and anti-concentration policies using support for the quiet-life hypothesis;
and (2) new industrial organization policies are needed if support for the
e¢ cient structure hypothesis is undesirable. In terms of the rst point, there
is the case where support for the quiet-life hypotheses decreases the EGLI
on the cost frontier (i.e., increases the degree of competition on the cost
frontier), so support for this hypothesis cannot always be used to justify
anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies, even if an increase in market
concentration decreases dynamic cost e¢ ciency. Justication for such policies
is restricted to the case where an increase in market concentration increases
the EGLI on the cost frontier (i.e., decreases the degree of competition on the
cost frontier). Thus the enactment and enforcement of anti-monopoly and
anti-concentration policies requires careful consideration. In terms of the
second point, thus far, a theoretical foundation suggesting that support for
the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is undesirable is not discerned. However,
at least theoretically, there are cases where both support for the e¢ cient
structure hypothesis decreases the EGLI on the cost frontier (i.e., increases
the degree of competition on the cost frontier) and increases the EGLI on the
cost frontier (i.e., decreases the degree of competition on the cost frontier). In
the latter case, it is judged that support for the e¢ cient structure hypothesis
is undesirable: new industrial organization policies would be needed which
di¤er from existing anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies and under
which an e¢ ciency improvement would increase the degree of competition
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on the cost frontier.
From Denition 14 and Proposition 5, regarding the relation between the
e¢ cient structure hypothesis and the EGLI on the cost frontier, the following
two propositions can be derived for clarifying under what assumptions the
e¢ cient structure hypothesis increases or decreases the EGLI on the cost
frontier.
Proposition 11 The EGLI on the cost frontier decreases with dynamic cost
e¢ ciency in the previous period and the j-th optimal planned nancial good
in the current period (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost frontier
increases with them, @EGLIFi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 < 0 and @EGLI
F
i;j;t

@qpi;j;t < 0)
if and only if the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is accepted (i.e., dynamic
e¢ ciency improves, @qpi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 > 0) under the following assumptions:
(A1) The j-th nancial good is an output (i.e., pSURFi;j;t > 0 and MC
DFV 
i;j;t > 0);
and (A2) One of the following two pairs of inequalities holds:
@pGURFi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 > max
 
MEi;j;t;
 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t @EFDi;t 1 
and @pGURFi;j;t

@qpi;j;t > max
 
MQi;j;t;
 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t @qpi;j;t  ,
or
 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t @EFDi;t 1  < @pGURFi;j;t @EFDi;t 1 < MEi;j;t
and
 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t @qpi;j;t  < @pGURFi;j;t @qpi;j;t < MQi;j;t,
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where MEi;j;t and MQi;j;t are respectively expressed as
MEi;j;t =
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@EFDi;t 1
 MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t 1@EF
D
i;t
, 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
, (5.1)
MQi;j;t =
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@qpi;j;t
 MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@qpi;j;t@EF
D
i;t
, 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
. (5.2)
Proof. From Denition 14 (Eq. (2.2.4.3)), the following equation holds:
@EGLIFi;j;t
@X
=
 
pSURFi;j;t
 1  MCDFV i;j;t
pSURFi;j;t
 @p
SURF
i;j;t
@X
  @MC
DFV 
i;j;t
@X
!
,
(X = EFDi;t 1 or q
p
i;j;t). (P11.1)
From this equation, under assumption (A1), the following relation is then
revealed:
@EGLIFi;j;t
@X
> ( < )0() MC
DFV 
i;j;t
pSURFi;j;t
@p
SURF
i;j;t
@X
> ( < )
@MCDFV i;j;t
@X
 
=
@pGURFi;j;t
@X
!
,
(X = EFDi;t 1 or q
p
i;j;t). (P11.2)
In addition, from Proposition 5 (Eq. (3.1.1)), the following relation holds:
@qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
> 0() @p
GURF
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
> MEi;j;t and
@pGURFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
> MQi;j;t, or
@pGURFi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
< MEi;j;t and
@pGURFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
< MQi;j;t, (P11.3)
where MEi;j;t and MQi;j;t are respectively expressed as Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2).
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From relations (P11.2) and (P11.3), under assumptions (A1) and (A2), the
following relation is, therefore, established:
@qpi;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
> 0() @EGLI
F
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
< 0 and
@EGLIFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
< 0.
Proposition 12 The EGLI on the cost frontier increases with dynamic cost
e¢ ciency in the previous period and the j-th optimal planned nancial good
in the current period (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost frontier
decreases with them, @EGLIFi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 > 0 and @EGLI
F
i;j;t

@qpi;j;t > 0)
if and only if the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is accepted (i.e., dynamic
e¢ ciency improves, @qpi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 > 0) under the following assumptions:
(A3) assumption (A1) holds; and (A4) One of the following two pairs of
inequalities holds:
 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t @EFDi;t 1  > @pGURFi;j;t @EFDi;t 1 > MEi;j;t
and
 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t @qpi;j;t  > @pGURFi;j;t @qpi;j;t > MQi;j;t,
or
@pGURFi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 < min
 
MEi;j;t;
 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t @EFDi;t 1 
and @pGURFi;j;t

@qpi;j;t < min
 
MQi;j;t;
 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t @qpi;j;t  ,
where MEi;j;t and MQi;j;t are respectively expressed as Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
11, so we omit the derivation.
Consider the following. First, the e¤ect of improved dynamic cost e¢ -
ciency in the previous period on the GURP of the j-th planned optimal -
nancial good on the cost frontier (i.e., the dynamic frontier marginal variable
cost with respect to the j-th planned optimal nancial good) in the current
period (i.e., @pGURFi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 , hereafter EA) as a criterion for judging the
two magnitudes of the subtraction of the e¤ect of the same improvement in
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dynamic cost e¢ ciency on the elasticity of dynamic actual variable cost in
the current period with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the current pe-
riod, which is corrected by the ratio of dynamic actual marginal variable cost
with respect to the j-th planned optimal nancial good in the current period
to the square of this elasticity, from the e¤ect of the same improvement in
dynamic cost e¢ ciency on the same dynamic actual marginal variable cost,
which is corrected by the dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current
period (i.e., MEi;j;t, hereafter EB), and the e¤ect of the same improvement
in dynamic cost e¢ ciency on the SURP of the j-th planned optimal nan-
cial good on the cost frontier in the current period, which is discounted by
the ratio of dynamic frontier marginal variable cost with respect to the j-
th planned optimal nancial good in the current period to the same SURP
on the cost frontier (i.e.,
 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t @EFDi;t 1 , hereafter
EC). Second, consider the foregoing in terms of the e¤ect of an increase in
the j-th planned optimal nancial good in the current period on the same
GURP on the cost frontier (i.e., @pGURFi;j;t

@qpi;j;t , hereafter QA) as a crite-
rion for judging the two magnitudes of the subtraction of the corrected e¤ect
of the same increase in the j-th planned optimal nancial good on the same
elasticity of dynamic actual variable cost from the corrected e¤ect of the same
increase in the j-th planned optimal nancial good on the same dynamic ac-
tual marginal variable cost (i.e., MQi;j;t, hereafter QB), and the discounted
e¤ect of the same increase in the j-th planned optimal nancial good on the
same SURP on the cost frontier (i.e.,
 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t @qpi;j;t ,
hereafter QC). Then from assumption (A2) in Proposition 11, the EB and
EC are small from the perspective of the EA, and the QB and QC are also
small from the perspective of the QA, or the EB is large whilst the EC is
small from the perspective of the EA, and the QB is large whilst the QC is
small from the perspective of the QA. Similarly, from assumption (A4) in
Proposition 12, the EB is small and the EC is large from the perspective of
the EA, and the QB is small and the QC is large from the perspective of the
QA, or the EB and EC are large from the perspective of the EA, and the
QB and QC are also large from the perspective of the QA.
Similar to Propositions 11 and 12, from Denition 14 and Proposition
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7, regarding the relation between the quiet-life hypothesis and the EGLI on
the cost frontier, the following two propositions can be derived to theoret-
ically clarify under what assumptions the quiet-life hypothesis increases or
decreases the EGLI on the cost frontier.
Proposition 13 The EGLI on the cost frontier decreases with the Hernd-
ahl index in the previous period (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost
frontier increases with it, @EGLIFi;j;t /@HIj;t 1 < 0) if and only if the quiet-
life hypothesis is accepted (i.e., @EFDi;t /@HIj;t 1 < 0). Thus, the EGLI on
the cost frontier increases with dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the "current" pe-
riod (i.e., @EGLIFi;j;t

@EFDi;t > 0) under the following assumptions: (A5)
The j-th nancial good is an output (i.e., pSURFi;j;t > 0 and MC
DFV 
i;j;t > 0) and
the sign of MCDAV i;j;t is the same as the sign of MC
DFV 
i;j;t (i.e., MC
DAV 
i;j;t > 0);
and (A6) The following inequality holds:
MCDFV i;j;t
pSURFi;j;t
 @p
SURF
i;j;t
@HIj;t 1
<
@pGURFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
< MHi;j;t,
where MHi;j;t is expressed as
MHi;j;t =
8<:EFDi;t +
 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
! 19=;  @MCDAV i;j;t@HIj;t 1
 MCDAV i;j;t 
@2 lnCDAVi;t
@HIj;t 1@EFDi;t
, 
@ lnCDAVi;t
@EFDi;t
!2
. (5.3)
Proof. From Eq. (P11.1), under assumption (A5), and replacing EFDi;t 1 or
qpi;j;t with HIj;t 1, the following relation is revealed:
@EGLIFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
> ( < )0() MC
DFV 
i;j;t
pSURFi;j;t
 @p
SURF
i;j;t
@HIj;t 1
> ( < )
@MCDFV i;j;t
@HIj;t 1
 
=
@pGURFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
!
.
(P13.1)
In addition, from Proposition 7 (Eq. (3.2.1)), under assumption (A5), the
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following relation holds:
@EFDi;t
@HIj;t 1
< 0() @p
GURF
i;j;t
@HIj;t 1
< MHi;j;t, (P13.2)
where MHi;j;t is expressed as Eq. (5.3). Then from relations (P13.1) and
(P13.2) under assumptions (A5) and (A6), the following relation is estab-
lished:
@EFDi;t
@HIj;t 1
< 0() @EGLI
F
i;j;t
@HIj;t 1
< 0.
Consequently, from this relation, the following inequality holds:
@EGLIFi;j;t
@EFDi;t
=
@EGLIFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1

 
@EFDi;t
@HIj;t 1
! 1
> 0.
Proposition 14 The EGLI on the cost frontier increases with the Hernd-
ahl index in the previous period (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost
frontier decreases, @EGLIFi;j;t /@HIj;t 1 > 0) if and only if the quiet-life hy-
pothesis is accepted (i.e., @EFDi;t /@HIj;t 1 < 0). The EGLI on the cost
frontier decreases with dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the "current" period (i.e.,
@EGLIFi;j;t

@EFDi;t < 0) under the following assumptions: (A7) Assumption
(A5) holds; and (A8) The following inequality holds:
@pGURFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
< min
 
MHi;j;t;
MCDFV i;j;t
pSURFi;j;t
 @p
SURF
i;j;t
@HIj;t 1
!
,
where MHi;j;t is expressed as Eq. (5.3).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
13, so we omit the derivation.
Similar to Propositions 11 and 12, considering the e¤ect of an increase
in the Herndahl index in the previous period on the GURP of the j-th
planned optimal nancial good on the cost frontier in the current period (i.e.,
@pGURFi;j;t /@HIj;t 1 , hereafter HA) as a criterion for judging the two magni-
tudes of the subtraction of the e¤ect of the same increase in the Herndahl
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index on the elasticity of dynamic actual variable cost in the current period
with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the current period, which is cor-
rected by the ratio of dynamic actual marginal variable cost with respect to
the j-th planned optimal nancial good in the current period to the square
of this elasticity, from the e¤ect of the same increase in the Herndahl index
on the same dynamic actual marginal variable cost, which is corrected by
dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current period (i.e., MHi;j;t, here-
after HB), and the e¤ect of the same increase in the Herndahl index on
the SURP of the j-th planned optimal nancial good on the cost frontier
in the current period, which is discounted by the ratio of dynamic frontier
marginal variable cost with respect to the j-th planned optimal nancial
good in the current period to the same SURP on the cost frontier (i.e., 
MCDFV i;j;t

pSURFi;j;t
   @pSURFi;j;t /@HIj;t 1 , hereafter HC), assumption (A6) in
Proposition 13 means that the HB is large and the HC is small from the
perspective of the HA. Similarly, assumption (A8) in Proposition 14 means
that the HB and HC are large from the perspective of the HA.
From the perspective of the EGLI on the cost frontier, in the case that
the EC is small from the perspective of the EA, and the QC is also small
from the perspective of the QA, then support for the e¢ cient structure hy-
pothesis is desirable, whereas if the EC is large from the perspective of the
EA, and the QC is also large from the perspective of the QA, then support
for this hypothesis is undesirable. In the former case, the ratio of the dis-
crepancy between the SURP on the cost frontier and the dynamic frontier
marginal variable cost to the same SURP decreases, so the EGLI on the
cost frontier decreases (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost frontier
increases), whereas, in the latter case, the ratio increases, so the EGLI on
the cost frontier increases (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost frontier
decreases). Regarding the quiet-life hypothesis, where HC is small from the
perspective of HA, support for this hypothesis is desirable. In this case, the
EGLI on the cost frontier decreases with the Herndahl index (i.e., the degree
of competition on the cost frontier increases with it), so anti-monopoly and
anti-concentration policies are unnecessary, even if dynamic cost e¢ ciency
decreases with the Herndahl index. Although it is for empirical studies to
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explore whether and when this case actually exists, at least theoretically,
support for the quiet-life hypothesis need not become a justication for anti-
monopoly and anti-concentration policies. Justication for such policies is
restricted to where the EGLI on the cost frontier increases with the Hernd-
ahl index (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost frontier decreases with
it), so enactment and enforcement of such policies require careful consider-
ation. Similarly, regarding the e¢ cient structure hypotheses, where the EC
is large from the perspective of the EA, and the QC is also large from the
perspective of the QA, support for this hypothesis is undesirable, so policy
interventions which decrease the EC and QC are necessary. Put di¤erently,
policies which do not substantially increase the SURP on the cost frontier,
or which substantially decrease the discrepancy between the SURP on the
cost frontier and the dynamic frontier marginal variable cost are required.
In any case, new industrial organization policies which di¤er from existing
anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies, and under which an e¢ ciency
improvement would increase the degree of competition on the cost frontier,
are required. This novel implication for existing industrial organization poli-
cies is revealed by providing the theoretical foundation for suggesting that
support for the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is undesirable.
6 Intertemporal Regular Linkages
This section theoretically claries the relations between the e¢ cient struc-
ture and quiet-life hypotheses and the intertemporal regular linkages (i.e.,
cyclical linkages, monotonic trending linkages, and terminal up-and-down
volatile linkages) of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, single-period op-
timal planned nancial goods, single-period Herndahl indices, and single-
period EGLIs on the cost frontier.
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6.1 Intertemporal Regular Linkages of Single-Period
Dynamic Cost E¢ ciencies
The intertemporal regular linkage (i.e., cyclical linkage, monotonic trending
linkage, or terminal up-and-down volatile linkage) of single-period dynamic
cost e¢ ciencies is principally dened as the following relations between dy-
namic cost e¢ ciencies in period t  1 and period t  1+2T (i.e., EFDi;t 1 and
EFDi;t 1+2T ), where T is a natural number.
Denition 20 (Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Dynamic Cost E¢ ciencies)
The intertemporal regular linkage of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies
exists if any one of the following linkages (i.e., cyclical linkage, monotonic
trending linkage, and terminal up-and-down volatile linkage) exists mainly
between the dynamic cost e¢ ciencies in period t   1 and period t   1 + 2T
(i.e., EFDi;t 1 and EF
D
i;t 1+2T ), where T is a natural number. (E1) (Cyclical
Linkage) Dynamic cost e¢ ciency in period t   2 + 2T (i.e., EFDi;t 2+2T ) is
dependent on dynamic cost e¢ ciency in period t  3 + 2T (i.e., EFDi;t 3+2T ),
so @EFDi;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T is positive, negative, or zero. Dynamic cost
e¢ ciency in period t   1 + 2T (i.e., EFDi;t 1+2T ) is, moreover, dependent
on dynamic cost e¢ ciency in period t   1 (i.e., EFDi;t 1), so the sign of
@EFDi;t 1+2T

@EFDi;t 1 is positive if T is an even number or negative if T
is an odd number; (E2) (Monotonic Trending Linkage) EFDi;t 2+2T is de-
pendent on EFDi;t 3+2T , so @EF
D
i;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T is nonnegative (i.e.,
@EFDi;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T  0). EFDi;t 1+2T is, moreover, dependent on EFDi;t 1,
so the sign of @EFDi;t 1+2T

@EFDi;t 1 is positive (i.e., @EF
D
i;t 1+2T

@EFDi;t 1 >
0); and (E3) (Terminal Up-and-Down Volatile Linkage) EFDi;t 2+2T is de-
pendent on EFDi;t 3+2T , so the sign of @EF
D
i;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T is nega-
tive (i.e., @EFDi;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T < 0). EF
D
i;t 1+2T is, moreover, de-
pendent on EFDi;t 1, so the sign of @EF
D
i;t 1+2T

@EFDi;t 1 is positive (i.e.,
@EFDi;t 1+2T

@EFDi;t 1  0).
The relations between this linkage and the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life
hypotheses are derived from the following proposition.
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Proposition 15 @EFDi;t 1+2T

@EFDi;t 1 , where T is a natural number, is
expressed as follows:
@EFDi;t 1+2T
@EFDi;t 1
=
TY
k=1
"
@EFDi;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
 dHIj;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
 @q
p
i;j;t 2+2k
@EFDi;t 3+2k
#
. (6.1.1)
Proof. @EFDi;t+1

@EFDi;t 1 is expressed as follows:
@EFDi;t+1
@EFDi;t 1
=
@EFDi;t+1
@HIj;t
 dHIj;t
dqpi;j;t
 @q
p
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
. (P15.1)
Similarly, @EFDi;t+3

@EFDi;t 1 is expressed as follows:
@EFDi;t+3
@EFDi;t 1
=
"
@EFDi;t+3
@HIj;t+2
 dHIj;t+2
dqpi;j;t+2
 @q
p
i;j;t+2
@EFDi;t+1
#

"
@EFDi;t+1
@HIj;t
 dHIj;t
dqpi;j;t
 @q
p
i;j;t
@EFDi;t 1
#
.
(P15.2)
Consequently, from Eqs. (P15.1) and (P15.2), @EFDi;t 1+2T

@EFDi;t 1 , where
T is a natural number, is expressed as Eq. (6.1.1).
From Proposition 15 (Eq. (6.1.1)), the relations between the e¢ cient
structure and quiet-life hypotheses and the intertemporal regular linkages
(i.e., cyclical linkage, monotonic trending linkage, and terminal up-and-down
volatile linkage) of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies are shown as the
following three propositions.
Proposition 16 The cyclical linkage of single-period dynamic cost e¢ cien-
cies occurs if one of two triplets of assumptions holds: (A0), (A1), and (A2);
or (A0), (B1), and (B2).
(A0) Dynamic cost e¢ ciency in period t   2 + 2T (i.e., EFDi;t 2+2T ),
where T is a natural number, is dependent on dynamic cost e¢ ciency in
period t  3 + 2T (i.e., EFDi;t 3+2T ), so @EFDi;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T is positive,
negative, or zero;
(A1) The j-th optimal planned nancial goods in periods t  2 + 2k (i.e.,
qpi;j;t 2+2k), where k = 1; : : : ; T , are large; that is, the following inequalities
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hold:
qpi;j;t 2+2k >
P
i
 
qpi;j;t 2+2k
2P
k q
p
k;j;t 2+2k

 
1 +
X
k 6=i
dqpk;j;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
!
 
X
h 6=i
 
qph;j;t 2+2k 
dqph;j;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
!
, (k = 1; : : : ; T ); (6.1.2)
(A2) Both the e¢ cient structure hypothesis from period t   3 + 2k to
period t  2+2k and the quiet-life hypothesis from period t  2+2k to period
t  1 + 2k are supported or unsupported; that is, one of the two pairs of the
following inequalities holds:
@qpi;j;t 2+2k
@EFDi;t 3+2k
> 0 and
@EFDi;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
< 0, or
@qpi;j;t 2+2k
@EFDi;t 3+2k
< 0 and
@EFDi;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
> 0, (k = 1; : : : ; T ); (6.1.3)
(B1) qpi;j;t 2+2k (k = 1; : : : ; T ) are small; that is, the following inequalities
hold:
qpi;j;t 2+2k <
P
i
 
qpi;j;t 2+2k
2P
k q
p
k;j;t 2+2k

 
1 +
X
k 6=i
dqpk;j;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
!
 
X
h 6=i
 
qph;j;t 2+2k 
dqph;j;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
!
, (k = 1; : : : ; T ); (6.1.4)
and (B2) Any one of the e¢ cient structure hypothesis from period t 3+2k
to period t   2 + 2k and the quiet-life hypothesis from period t   2 + 2k to
period t  1+ 2k is supported or unsupported; that is, one of the two pairs of
the following inequalities holds:
@qpi;j;t 2+2k
@EFDi;t 3+2k
> 0 and
@EFDi;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
> 0, or
@qpi;j;t 2+2k
@EFDi;t 3+2k
< 0 and
@EFDi;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
< 0, (k = 1; : : : ; T ). (6.1.5)
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Proof. Assumption (A0) is the same as the rst part of the denition of
the cyclical linkage of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies (i.e., (E1) in
Denition 20). The remainder of this denition is met as follows. From the
denition of the Herndahl index, the following equations hold:
dHIj;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
= 2
 X
k
qpk;j;t 2+2k
! 3

"(
qpi;j;t 2+2k +
X
h 6=i
 
qph;j;t 2+2k 
dqph;j;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
!)

 X
k
qpk;j;t 2+2k
!
 
(X
i
 
qpi;j;t 2+2k
2)  1 +X
k 6=i
dqpk;j;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
!#
,
(k = 1; : : : ; T ). (P16.1)
From these equations, the following relations are revealed:
dHIj;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
> ( = , < )0
() qpi;j;t 2+2k > ( = , < )
P
i
 
qpi;j;t 2+2k
2P
k q
p
k;j;t 2+2k

 
1 +
X
k 6=i
dqpk;j;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
!
 
X
h 6=i
 
qph;j;t 2+2k 
dqph;j;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
!
, (k = 1; : : : ; T ). (P16.2)
From these relations and assumptions (A1) and (B1), the signs of dHIj;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k (k = 1; : : : ; T ) in Eq. (P16.1) are positive and negative, respec-
tively (i.e., dHIj;t 2+2k

dqpi;j;t 2+2k > 0 and dHIj;t 2+2k

dqpi;j;t 2+2k < 0,
respectively, for k = 1; : : : ; T ). In addition, from assumptions (A2) and
(B2), the following inequalities for Eq. (6.1.1) hold:
@EFDi;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
 dHIj;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
 @q
p
i;j;t 2+2k
@EFDi;t 3+2k
< 0, (k = 1; : : : ; T ). (P16.3)
From these inequalities and Eq. (6.1.1), the sign of @EFDi;t 1+2T

@EFDi;t 1 is
positive if T is an even number or negative if T is an odd number.
Proposition 17 The monotonic trending linkage of single-period dynamic
cost e¢ ciencies occurs if one of two triplets of the four assumptions of Propo-
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sition 16 and assumption (C0) holds: (C0), (A1), and (B2); or (C0), (B1),
and (A2).
(C0) EFDi;t 2+2T is dependent on EF
D
i;t 3+2T , so @EF
D
i;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T
is nonnegative (i.e., @EFDi;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T  0).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
16, so we omit the derivation.
Proposition 18 The terminal up-and-down volatile linkage of single-period
dynamic cost e¢ ciencies occurs if one of two triplets of the four assumptions
of Proposition 16 and assumption (D0) holds: (D0), (A1), and (B2); or
(D0), (B1), and (A2).
(D0) EFDi;t 2+2T is dependent on EF
D
i;t 3+2T , so the sign of @EF
D
i;t 2+2T
@EFDi;t 3+2T is negative (i.e., @EF
D
i;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T < 0).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
16, so we omit the derivation.
6.2 Intertemporal Regular Linkages of Single-Period
Optimal Planned Financial Goods
Similar to the intertemporal regular linkage (i.e., cyclical linkage, monotonic
trending linkage, or terminal up-and-down volatile linkage) of single-period
dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, the same intertemporal regular linkage of single-
period optimal planned nancial goods is principally dened as the following
relations between the j-th optimal planned nancial goods in period t and
period t+ 2T (i.e., qpi;j;t and q
p
i;j;t+2T ), where T is a natural number.
Denition 21 (Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Financial Goods)
The intertemporal regular linkage of single-period optimal planned nan-
cial goods exists if any one of the following linkages (i.e., cyclical linkage,
monotonic trending linkage, and terminal up-and-down volatile linkage) ex-
ists mainly between the j-th optimal planned nancial goods in period t and
period t + 2T (i.e., qpi;j;t and q
p
i;j;t+2T ), where T is a natural number: (F1)
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(Cyclical Linkage) The j-th optimal planned nancial good in period t 1+2T
(i.e., qpi;j;t 1+2T ) is dependent on the j-th optimal planned nancial good in
period t   2 + 2T (i.e., qpi;j;t 2+2T ), so @qpi;j;t 1+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T is positive,
negative, or zero. The j-th optimal planned nancial good in period t + 2T
(i.e., qpi;j;t+2T ) is, moreover, dependent on the j-th optimal planned nan-
cial good in period t (i.e., qpi;j;t), so the sign of @q
p
i;j;t+2T

@qpi;j;t is positive if
T is an even number, whereas this sign is negative if T is an odd number;
(F2) (Monotonic Trending Linkage) qpi;j;t 1+2T is dependent on q
p
i;j;t 2+2T , so
@qpi;j;t 1+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T is nonnegative (i.e., @q
p
i;j;t 1+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T  0).
qpi;j;t+2T is, moreover, dependent on q
p
i;j;t, so the sign of @q
p
i;j;t+2T

@qpi;j;t is pos-
itive (i.e., @qpi;j;t+2T

@qpi;j;t > 0); and (F3) (Terminal Up-and-Down Volatile
Linkage) qpi;j;t 1+2T is dependent on q
p
i;j;t 2+2T , so the sign of @q
p
i;j;t 1+2T
@qpi;j;t 2+2T is negative (i.e., @q
p
i;j;t 1+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T < 0). q
p
i;j;t+2T is, more-
over, dependent on qpi;j;t, so the sign of @q
p
i;j;t+2T

@qpi;j;t is positive (i.e.,
@qpi;j;t+2T

@qpi;j;t > 0).
Similar to Proposition 15, the relations between this linkage and the
e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses are derived from the following
proposition.
Proposition 19 @qpi;j;t+2T

@qpi;j;t , where T is a natural number, is expressed
as follows:
@qpi;j;t+2T
@qpi;j;t
=
TY
k=1
"
@qpi;j;t+2k
@EFDi;t 1+2k
 @EF
D
i;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
 dHIj;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
#
. (6.2.1)
Proof. @qpi;j;t+2

@qpi;j;t is expressed as follows:
@qpi;j;t+2
@qpi;j;t
=
@qpi;j;t+2
@EFDi;t+1
 @EF
D
i;t+1
@HIj;t
 dHIj;t
dqpi;j;t
. (P19.1)
Similarly, @qpi;j;t+4

@qpi;j;t is expressed as follows:
@qpi;j;t+4
@qpi;j;t
=
"
@qpi;j;t+4
@EFDi;t+3
 @EF
D
i;t+3
@HIj;t+2
 dHIj;t+2
dqpi;j;t+2
#

"
@qpi;j;t+2
@EFDi;t+1
 @EF
D
i;t+1
@HIj;t
 dHIj;t
dqpi;j;t
#
.
(P19.2)
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Consequently, from Eqs. (P19.1) and (P19.2), @qpi;j;t+2T

@qpi;j;t , where T is a
natural number, is expressed as Eq. (6.2.1).
From Proposition 19 (Eq. (6.2.1)), the relations between the e¢ cient
structure and quiet-life hypotheses and the intertemporal regular linkages
(i.e., cyclical linkage, monotonic trending linkage, and terminal up-and-down
volatile linkage) of single-period optimal planned nancial goods are distilled
as the following three propositions.
Proposition 20 The cyclical linkage of single-period optimal planned nan-
cial goods occurs if one of two triplets of the two assumptions of Proposition
16 and assumptions (E0), (C2), and (D2) holds: (E0), (A1), and (C2); or
(E0), (B1), and (D2).
(E0) The j-th optimal planned nancial good in period t   1 + 2T (i.e.,
qpi;j;t 1+2T ) is dependent on the j-th optimal planned nancial good in period
t  2 + 2T (i.e., qpi;j;t 2+2T ), so @qpi;j;t 1+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T is positive, negative,
or zero;
(C2) Both the quiet-life hypothesis from period t 2+2k to period t 1+2k
and the e¢ cient structure hypothesis from period t 1+2k to period t+2k are
supported or unsupported; that is, one of the following two pairs of inequalities
holds:
@EFDi;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
< 0 and
@qpi;j;t+2k
@EFDi;t 1+2k
> 0, or
@EFDi;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
> 0 and
@qpi;j;t+2k
@EFDi;t 1+2k
< 0, (k = 1; : : : ; T ); (6.2.2)
and (D2) Any one of the quiet-life hypothesis from period t   2 + 2k to
period t  1+ 2k and the e¢ cient structure hypothesis from period t  1+ 2k
to period t+2k is supported or unsupported; that is, one of the following two
pairs of inequalities holds:
@EFDi;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
< 0 and
@qpi;j;t+2k
@EFDi;t 1+2k
< 0, or
@EFDi;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
> 0 and
@qpi;j;t+2k
@EFDi;t 1+2k
> 0, (k = 1; : : : ; T ). (6.2.3)
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Proof. Assumption (E0) is the same as the rst part of the denition of the
cyclical linkage of single-period optimal planned nancial goods (i.e., (F1) in
Denition 21). The remainder of this denition is met as follows. From the
proof of Proposition 16, assumptions (A1) and (B1) dictate that the signs of
dHIj;t 2+2k

dqpi;j;t 2+2k (k = 1; : : : ; T ) in Eq. (P16.1) are positive and nega-
tive, respectively (i.e., dHIj;t 2+2k

dqpi;j;t 2+2k > 0 and dHIj;t 2+2k

dqpi;j;t 2+2k
< 0, respectively, for k = 1; : : : ; T ). In addition, from assumptions (C2) and
(D2), the following inequalities for Eq. (6.2.1) hold:
@qpi;j;t+2k
@EFDi;t 1+2k
 @EF
D
i;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
 dHIj;t 2+2k
dqpi;j;t 2+2k
< 0, (k = 1; : : : ; T ). (P20.1)
From these inequalities and Eq. (6.2.1), the sign of @qpi;j;t+2T

@qpi;j;t is positive
if T is an even number, and negative if T is an odd number.
Proposition 21 The monotonic trending linkage of single-period optimal
planned nancial goods occurs if one of two triplets of the four assumptions
of Propositions 16 and 20 and assumption (F0) holds: (F0), (A1), and (D2);
or (F0), (B1), and (C2).
(F0) qpi;j;t 1+2T is dependent on q
p
i;j;t 2+2T , so @q
p
i;j;t 1+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T is
nonnegative (i.e., @qpi;j;t 1+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T  0).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
20, so we omit the derivation.
Proposition 22 The terminal up-and-down volatile linkage of single-period
optimal planned nancial goods occurs if one of two triplets of the four as-
sumptions of Propositions 16 and 20 and assumption G0 holds: (G0), (A1),
and (D2); or (G0), (B1), and (C2).
(G0) qpi;j;t 1+2T is dependent on q
p
i;j;t 2+2T , so the sign of @q
p
i;j;t 1+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T
is negative (i.e., @qpi;j;t 1+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T < 0).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
20, so we omit the derivation.
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6.3 Intertemporal Regular Linkages of Single-Period
Herndahl Indices
Similar to the intertemporal regular linkages (i.e., cyclical linkages, monotonic
trending linkages, and terminal up-and-down volatile linkages) of single-
period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies and single-period optimal planned nancial
goods, the same intertemporal regular linkage of single-period Herndahl
indices is mainly dened as the following relations between the Herndahl
indices in period t and period t+ 2T (i.e., HIj;t and HIj;t+2T ), where T is a
natural number.
Denition 22 (Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Herndahl Indices)
The intertemporal regular linkage of single-period Herndahl indices exists if
any one of the following linkages (i.e., cyclical linkage, monotonic trending
linkage, and terminal up-and-down volatile linkage) mainly exists between the
Herndahl indices in period t and period t + 2T (i.e., HIj;t and HIj;t+2T ),
where T is a natural number. (H1) (Cyclical Linkage) The Herndahl index
in period t   1 + 2T (i.e., HIj;t 1+2T ) is dependent on the Herndahl index
in period t   2 + 2T (i.e., HIj;t 2+2T ), so @HIj;t 1+2T /@HIj;t 2+2T is posi-
tive, negative, or zero. The Herndahl index in period t+2T (i.e., HIj;t+2T )
is, moreover, dependent on the Herndahl index in period t (i.e., HIj;t), so
the sign of @HIj;t+2T /@HIj;t is positive if T is an even number and negative
if T is an odd number; (H2) (Monotonic Trending Linkage) HIj;t 1+2T is
dependent on HIj;t 2+2T , so @HIj;t 1+2T /@HIj;t 2+2T is nonnegative (i.e.,
@HIj;t 1+2T /@HIj;t 2+2T  0). HIj;t+2T is, moreover, dependent on HIj;t,
so the sign of @HIj;t+2T /@HIj;t is positive (i.e., @HIj;t+2T /@HIj;t > 0);
and (H3) (Terminal Up-and-Down Volatile Linkage) HIj;t 1+2T is depen-
dent on HIj;t 2+2T , so the sign of @HIj;t 1+2T /@HIj;t 2+2T is negative (i.e.,
@HIj;t 1+2T /@HIj;t 2+2T < 0). HIj;t+2T is, moreover, dependent on HIj;t,
so the sign of @HIj;t+2T /@HIj;t is positive (i.e., @HIj;t+2T /@HIj;t > 0).
Similar to Propositions 15 and 19, the relations between this linkage and
the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses are derived from the following
proposition.
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Proposition 23 @HIj;t+2T /@HIj;t , where T is a natural number, is ex-
pressed as follows:
@HIj;t+2T
@HIj;t
=
TY
k=1
"
dHIj;t+2k
dqpi;j;t+2k
 @q
p
i;j;t+2k
@EFDi;t 1+2k
 @EF
D
i;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
#
. (6.3.1)
Proof. @HIj;t+2 /@HIj;t is expressed as follows:
@HIj;t+2
@HIj;t
=
dHIj;t+2
dqpi;j;t+2
 @q
p
i;j;t+2
@EFDi;t+1
 @EF
D
i;t+1
@HIj;t
. (P23.1)
Similarly, @HIj;t+4 /@HIj;t is expressed as follows:
@HIj;t+4
@HIj;t
=
"
dHIj;t+4
dqpi;j;t+4
 @q
p
i;j;t+4
@EFDi;t+3
 @EF
D
i;t+3
@HIj;t+2
#

"
dHIj;t+2
dqpi;j;t+2
 @q
p
i;j;t+2
@EFDi;t+1
 @EF
D
i;t+1
@HIj;t
#
.
(P23.2)
Consequently, from Eqs. (P23.1) and (P23.2), @HIj;t+2T /@HIj;t , where T is
a natural number, is expressed as Eq. (6.3.1).
From Proposition 23 (Eq. (6.3.1)), the relations between the e¢ cient
structure and quiet-life hypotheses and the intertemporal regular linkages
(i.e., cyclical linkage, monotonic trending linkage, and terminal up-and-down
volatile linkage) of single-period Herndahl indices are distilled as the follow-
ing three propositions.
Proposition 24 The cyclical linkage of single-period Herndahl indices oc-
curs if one of two triplets of the two assumptions of Proposition 20 and
assumption (H0) holds: (H0), (E1), and (C2); or (H0), (F1), and (D2).
(H0) The Herndahl index in period t   1 + 2T (i.e., HIj;t 1+2T ) is de-
pendent on the Herndahl index in period t   2 + 2T (i.e., HIj;t 2+2T ), so
@HIj;t 1+2T /@HIj;t 2+2T is positive, negative, or zero;
(E1) The j-th optimal planned nancial goods in periods t + 2k, where
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k = 1; : : : ; T , (i.e., qpi;j;t+2k) are large, that is, the following inequalities hold:
qpi;j;t+2k >
P
i
 
qpi;j;t+2k
2P
k q
p
k;j;t+2k

 
1 +
X
k 6=i
dqpk;j;t+2k
dqpi;j;t+2k
!
 
X
h 6=i
 
qph;j;t+2k 
dqph;j;t+2k
dqpi;j;t+2k
!
, (k = 1; : : : ; T ); (6.3.2)
and (F1) qpi;j;t+2k (k = 1; : : : ; T ) are small, that is, the following inequali-
ties hold:
qpi;j;t+2k <
P
i
 
qpi;j;t+2k
2P
k q
p
k;j;t+2k

 
1 +
X
k 6=i
dqpk;j;t+2k
dqpi;j;t+2k
!
 
X
h 6=i
 
qph;j;t+2k 
dqph;j;t+2k
dqpi;j;t+2k
!
, (k = 1; : : : ; T ). (6.3.3)
Proof. Assumption (H0) is the same as the rst part of the denition of
the cyclical linkage of single-period Herndahl indices (i.e., (H1) in Deni-
tion 21). The remainder of this denition is met as follows. From relation
(P16.2) of Proposition 16 and replacing periods t   2 + 2k (k = 1; : : : ; T )
with t+2k (k = 1; : : : ; T ), assumptions (E1) and (F1) mean that the signs of
dHIj;t+2k

dqpi;j;t+2k (k = 1; : : : ; T ) in Eq. (P16.1) are positive and negative,
respectively (i.e., dHIj;t+2k

dqpi;j;t+2k > 0 and dHIj;t+2k

dqpi;j;t+2k < 0, re-
spectively, for k = 1; : : : ; T ). In addition, from assumptions (C2) and (D2),
the following inequalities for Eq. (6.3.1) hold:
dHIj;t+2k
dqpi;j;t+2k
 @q
p
i;j;t+2k
@EFDi;t 1+2k
 @EF
D
i;t 1+2k
@HIj;t 2+2k
< 0, (k = 1; : : : ; T ). (P24.1)
From these inequalities and Eq. (6.3.1), the sign of @HIj;t+2T /@HIj;t is
positive if T is an even number and negative if T is an odd number.
Proposition 25 The monotonic trending linkage of single-period Herndahl
indices occurs if one of two triplets of the four assumptions of Propositions
20 and 24 and assumption (I0) hold: (I0), (E1), and (D2); or (I0), (F1),
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and (C2).
(I0) HIj;t 1+2T is dependent on HIj;t 2+2T , so @HIj;t 1+2T /@HIj;t 2+2T
is nonnegative (i.e., @HIj;t 1+2T /@HIj;t 2+2T  0).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
24, so we omit the derivation.
Proposition 26 The terminal up-and-down volatile linkage of single-period
Herndahl indices occurs if one of two triplets of the four assumptions of
Propositions 20 and 24 and assumption (J0) hold: (J0), (E1), and (D2); or
(J0), (F1), and (C2).
(J0) HIj;t 1+2T is dependent on HIj;t 2+2T , so the sign of @HIj;t 1+2T
/@HIj;t 2+2T is negative (i.e., @HIj;t 1+2T /@HIj;t 2+2T < 0).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
24, so we omit the derivation.
6.4 Intertemporal Regular Linkages of Single-Period
EGLIs on the Cost Frontier
Similar to intertemporal regular linkages in the previous subsections of this
section, the same intertemporal regular linkage of single-period EGLIs on
the cost frontier is mainly dened as the following relations in period t and
period t+2T (i.e., EGLIFi;j;t and EGLI
F
i;j;t+2T ), where T is a natural number.
Denition 23 (Intertemporal Regular Linkage of EGLIs on the Cost Frontier)
The intertemporal regular linkage of single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier
exists if any one of the following linkages (i.e., cyclical linkage, monotonic
trending linkage, and terminal up-and-down volatile linkage) mainly exists
between the EGLIs on the cost frontier in period t and period t + 2T (i.e.,
EGLIFi;j;t and EGLI
F
i;j;t+2T ), where T is a natural number. (L1) (Cyclical
Linkage) The EGLI on the cost frontier in period t 1+2T (i.e., EGLIFi;j;t 1+2T )
is dependent on the EGLI on the cost frontier in period t   2 + 2T (i.e.,
EGLIFi;j;t 2+2T ), so @EGLI
F
i;j;t 1+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t 2+2T is positive, negative,
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or zero. The EGLI on the cost frontier in period t + 2T (i.e., EGLIFi;j;t+2T )
is, moreover, dependent on the EGLI on the cost frontier in period t (i.e.,
EGLIFi;j;t), so the sign of @EGLI
F
i;j;t+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t is positive (or negative)
if T is an even number, whereas this sign is negative (or positive) if T is
an odd number; (L2) (Monotonic Trending Linkage) EGLIFi;j;t 1+2T is de-
pendent on EGLIFi;j;t 2+2T , so @EGLI
F
i;j;t 1+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t 2+2T is nonneg-
ative (i.e., @EGLIFi;j;t 1+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t 2+2T  0). EGLIFi;j;t+2T is, more-
over, dependent on EGLIFi;j;t, so the sign of @EGLI
F
i;j;t+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t is
positive (i.e., @EGLIFi;j;t+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t > 0); and (H3) (Terminal Up-and-
Down Volatile Linkage) EGLIFi;j;t 1+2T is dependent on EGLI
F
i;j;t 2+2T , so the
sign of @EGLIFi;j;t 1+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t 2+2T is negative (i.e., @EGLI
F
i;j;t 1+2T
@EGLIFi;j;t 2+2T < 0). EGLI
F
i;j;t+2T is, moreover, dependent on EGLI
F
i;j;t,
so the sign of @EGLIFi;j;t+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t is positive (i.e., @EGLI
F
i;j;t+2T
@EGLIFi;j;t > 0). Otherwise @EGLI
F
i;j;t 1+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t 2+2T > 0 and
@EGLIFi;j;t+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t < 0.
Similar to Propositions 15, 19, and 23, the relations between this linkage
and the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses are derived from the
following proposition.
Proposition 27 @EGLIFi;j;t+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t , where T is a natural number,
is expressed as follows:
@EGLIFi;j;t+2T
@EGLIFi;j;t
=
@EGLIFi;j;t+2T
@EFDi;j;t 1+2T
 @EF
D
i;j;t 1+2T
@EFDi;j;t 1

 
@EGLIFi;j;t
@EFDi;j;t 1
! 1
=
@EGLIFi;j;t+2T
@qpi;j;t+2T
 @q
p
i;j;t+2T
@qpi;j;t

 
@EGLIFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
! 1
=
@EGLIFi;j;t+2T
@HIj;t 1+2T
 @HIj;t 1+2T
@HIj;t 1

 
@EGLIFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
! 1
.(6.4)
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Proof. @EGLIFi;j;t+2

@EGLIFi;j;t is expressed as follows:
@EGLIFi;j;t+2
@EGLIFi;j;t
=
@EGLIFi;j;t+2
@EFDi;j;t+1
 @EF
D
i;j;t+1
@EFDi;j;t 1

 
@EGLIFi;j;t
@EFDi;j;t 1
! 1
=
@EGLIFi;j;t+2
@qpi;j;t+2
 @q
p
i;j;t+2
@qpi;j;t

 
@EGLIFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
! 1
=
@EGLIFi;j;t+2
@HIj;t+1
 @HIj;t+1
@HIj;t 1

 
@EGLIFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
! 1
.(P27.1)
Similarly, @EGLIFi;j;t+4

@EGLIFi;j;t is expressed as follows:
@EGLIFi;j;t+4
@EGLIFi;j;t
=
@EGLIFi;j;t+4
@EFDi;j;t+3
 @EF
D
i;j;t+3
@EFDi;j;t 1

 
@EGLIFi;j;t
@EFDi;j;t 1
! 1
=
@EGLIFi;j;t+4
@qpi;j;t+4
 @q
p
i;j;t+4
@qpi;j;t

 
@EGLIFi;j;t
@qpi;j;t
! 1
=
@EGLIFi;j;t+4
@HIj;t+3
 @HIj;t+3
@HIj;t 1

 
@EGLIFi;j;t
@HIj;t 1
! 1
.(P27.2)
Consequently, from Eqs. (P27.1) and (P27.2), @EGLIFi;j;t+2T

@EGLIFi;j;t ,
where T is a natural number, is expressed as Eq. (6.4).
From Proposition 27 (Eq. (6.4)), the relations between the e¢ cient
structure and quiet-life hypotheses and the intertemporal regular linkages
(i.e., cyclical linkage, monotonic trending linkage, and terminal up-and-down
volatile linkage) of single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier are distilled as
the following three propositions.
Proposition 28 The cyclical linkage of single-period EGLIs on the cost
frontier occurs if one of six pairs of the following assumptions holds: (SA1)
and (SA2), (SB1) and (SB2), (SC1) and (SC2), (SD1) and (SA2), (SE1)
and (SB2), or (SF1) and (SC2).
(SA1) The signs of @EGLIFi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T
are the same as the signs of @EGLIFi;j;t+2T

@EFDi;t 1+2T and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 1+2T
@EFDi;t 2+2T , respectively;
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(SA2) One of two triplets of the assumptions of Proposition 16 holds:
(A0), (A1), and (A2); or (A0), (B1), and (B2);
(SB1) The signs of @EGLIFi;j;t

@qpi;j;t and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 2+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T
are the same as the signs of @EGLIFi;j;t+2T

@qpi;j;t+2T and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 1+2T
@qpi;j;t 1+2T , respectively;
(SB2) One of two triplets of the assumptions of Proposition 20 holds:
(E0), (A1), and (C2); or (E0), (B1), and (D2);
(SC1) The signs of @EGLIFi;j;t /@HIj;t 1 and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 2+2T /@HIj;t 3+2T
are the same as the signs of @EGLIFi;j;t+2T /@HIj;t 1+2T and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 1+2T
/@HIj;t 2+2T , respectively;
(SC2) One of two triplets of the assumptions of Proposition 24 holds in
t  1: (H0), (E1), and (C2); or (H0), (F1), and (D2);
(SD1) The signs of @EGLIFi;j;t

@EFDi;t 1 and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T
are di¤erent from the signs of @EGLIFi;j;t+2T

@EFDi;t 1+2T and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 1+2T
@EFDi;t 2+2T , respectively;
(SE1) The signs of @EGLIFi;j;t

@qpi;j;t and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 2+2T

@qpi;j;t 2+2T
are di¤erent from the signs of @EGLIFi;j;t+2T

@qpi;j;t+2T and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 1+2T
@qpi;j;t 1+2T , respectively;
(SF1) The signs of @EGLIFi;j;t /@HIj;t 1 and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 2+2T /@HIj;t 3+2T
are di¤erent from the signs of @EGLIFi;j;t+2T /@HIj;t 1+2T and @EGLI
F
i;j;t 1+2T
/@HIj;t 2+2T , respectively.
Proof. From Propositions 16, 20, and 24, assumptions (SA2), (SB2), and
(SC2) mean that the cyclical linkages of single-period dynamic cost e¢ -
ciencies, single-period optimal planned nancial goods, and single-period
Herndahl indices, respectively, occur. From Denition L1 of Denition 23
and Proposition 27 (Eq. (6.4)), assumptions (SA1), (SB1), and (SC1) mean
that the signs of these cyclical linkages are invariable, whereas assumptions
(SD1), (SE1), and (SF1) mean that the signs of these cyclical linkages are
inverse. From Denition L1 of Denition 23, the cyclical linkage of single-
period EGLIs on the cost frontier occurs.
Proposition 29 The monotonic trending linkage of single-period EGLIs on
the cost frontier occurs if one of six pairs of the six assumptions of Proposition
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28 and assumptions (MA2), (MB2), and (MC2) holds: (SA1) and (MA2),
(SB1) and (MB2), (SC1) and (MC2), (SD1) and (MA2), (SE1) and (MB2),
or (SF1) and (MC2).
(MA2) One of two triplets of the assumptions of Propositions 16 and 17
holds: (C0), (A1), and (B2); or (C0), (B1), and (A2);
(MB2) One of two triplets of the assumptions of Propositions 16, 20, and
21 holds: (F0), (A1), and (D2); or (F0), (B1), and (C2);
(MC2) One of two triplets of the assumptions of Propositions 20, 24, and
25 holds in t  1: (I0), (E1), and (D2); or (I0), (F1), and (C2).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
28 with the exception of replacing the cyclical linkage and so forth with the
monotonic trending linkage and so forth, so we omit the derivation.
Proposition 30 The terminal up-and-down volatile linkage of single-period
EGLIs on the cost frontier occurs if one of six pairs of the six assumptions
of Proposition 28 and assumptions (TA2), (TB2), and (TC2) holds: (SA1)
and (TA2), (SB1) and (TB2), (SC1) and (TC2), (SD1) and (TA2), (SE1)
and (TB2), or (SF1) and (TC2).
(TA2) One of two triplets of the assumptions of Propositions 16 and 18
holds: (D0), (A1), and (B2); or (D0), (B1), and (A2);
(TB2) One of two triplets of the assumptions of Propositions 16, 20, and
22 holds: (G0), (A1), and (D2); or (G0), (B1), and (C2);
(TC2) One of two triplets of the assumptions of Propositions 20, 24, and
26 holds in t  1: (J0), (E1), and (D2); or (J0), (F1), and (C2).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
28 with the exception of replacing the cyclical linkage and so forth with the
terminal up-and-down volatile linkage and so forth, so we omit the derivation.
6.5 Policy Implications
According to the results in this section, where there is an intertemporal regu-
lar linkage of single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier, the EGLI can increase
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or decrease at least in the short term except for monotonic trending linkages.
Therefore, over the short term, it is di¢ cult to judge the need for industrial
organization policies for promoting competition. However, from a long-term
perspective, if the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period EGLIs on
the cost frontier does not exhibit a downward trend, then industrial organiza-
tion policies for promoting long-term competition are needed. If this linkage
shows an upward trend caused mainly by an upward trend of the intertem-
poral regular linkage of single-period Herndahl indices, then anti-monopoly
and anti-concentration policies are justied from a long-term perspective. If
the upward trend of the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period EGLIs
on the cost frontier is, however, caused mainly by the intertemporal regu-
lar linkage of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies or single-period optimal
planned nancial goods, then other policies are desirable because, in this
case, anti-monopoly and anti-concentration interventions cause unnecessary
distortion in the economy. Specically, if this upward trend is caused mainly
by the downward (upward) trend of the intertemporal regular linkage of
single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, then industrial organization policies
for improving long-term dynamic cost e¢ ciency (industrial organization poli-
cies in which a long-term improvement in dynamic cost e¢ ciency increases
long-term competition) are needed. Similarly, if the upward trend of the
intertemporal regular linkage of single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier is
mainly caused by the downward (upward) trend of the intertemporal regu-
lar linkage of single-period optimal planned nancial goods, then industrial
organization policies for stimulating long-term growth (industrial organiza-
tion policies in which long-term growth increases long-term competition) are
needed.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, on the basis of the GURM constructed by Homma (2009, 2012),
we explored the e¢ cient structure hypothesis proposed by Demsetz (1973)
and the quiet-life hypothesis put forward by Berger and Hannan (1998). We
claried mathematical formulations and theoretical interpretations of both
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hypotheses, the relative magnitude of the e¢ cient structure hypothesis to the
quiet-life hypothesis, the relation between both hypotheses and the EGLI on
the cost frontier proposed by Homma (2009, 2012), and the relation be-
tween both hypotheses and the existence of intertemporal regular linkages
of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, single-period optimal planned -
nancial goods, single-period Herndahl indices, and single-period EGLIs on
the cost frontier. In the following, we summarize the major results and o¤er
conclusions.
7.1 Formulations
On the e¢ cient structure hypothesis, three formulations are possible. The
rst formulation is that the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is expressed by
the e¤ect of improved dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the previous period on the
planned optimal nancial good in the current period, so it is a direct deni-
tion of the e¢ cient structure hypothesis. The second formulation is that the
e¢ cient structure hypothesis is expressed by the ratio of the following two
sums, so it provides the foundation for rigorous theoretical interpretations:
the numerator is the sum of the net e¤ect of the improvement in dynamic
cost e¢ ciency in the previous period and the e¤ect of the same improvement.
The former net e¤ect is on the GURP on the cost frontier (i.e., the dynamic
frontier marginal variable cost with respect to the planned optimal nancial
good) in the current period and on dynamic actual marginal variable cost
with respect to the planned optimal nancial good in the current period.
This net e¤ect is normalized by the same dynamic actual marginal variable
cost and accounts for the correction in dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in
the current period. The latter e¤ect is on the elasticity of dynamic actual
variable cost in the current period with respect to dynamic cost e¢ ciency
in the current period. This e¤ect is normalized by the square of the same
elasticity. Similarly, the denominator is the sum of the net e¤ect of an in-
crease in the planned optimal nancial good in the current period and the
e¤ect of the same increase in the planned optimal nancial good. Similar
to the numerator, the former net e¤ect is on the same GURP and the same
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dynamic actual marginal variable cost. This net e¤ect is normalized by the
same dynamic actual marginal variable cost and accounts for the correction
in dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency in the current period. The latter e¤ect
is on the same elasticity of dynamic actual variable cost and is normalized
by the square of the same elasticity. The third formulation is that the net
e¤ect in the numerator of the second formulation is expressed by the sum
of the e¤ects of the improvement in dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the previous
period on the e¢ ciency di¤erence of the GURP of the planned optimal -
nancial good in the current period, the pricing error of the same nancial
good, and dynamic actual marginal variable cost with respect to the same -
nancial good, which is corrected by dynamic marginal cost ine¢ ciency in the
current period, respectively. Similar to the numerator, the net e¤ect in the
denominator of the second formulation is expressed by the sum of the e¤ects
of an increase in the planned optimal nancial good in the current period
on the same factors as the numerator. This formulation is, therefore, used
to thoroughly interpret the e¢ cient structure hypothesis with these e¤ects.
Similarly, regarding the quiet-life hypothesis, three formulations are also pos-
sible. The rst formulation is that the quiet-life hypothesis is expressed by
the e¤ect of an increase in the Herndahl index in the previous period on
dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the current period, so it is a direct denition of the
quiet-life hypothesis. The second formulation is that the quiet-life hypothesis
is expressed by the following ratio, so it provides the foundation for rigorous
theoretical interpretations: the numerator is the sum of the net e¤ect of the
same increase in the Herndahl index and the e¤ect of the same increase.
Similar to the case of the e¢ cient structure hypothesis, the former net e¤ect
is on the same GURP and the same dynamic actual marginal variable cost.
This net e¤ect is normalized by the same dynamic actual marginal variable
cost and accounts for the same correction in dynamic marginal cost e¢ ciency.
The latter e¤ect is on the same elasticity of dynamic actual variable cost, and
is normalized by the same square of the same elasticity. The denominator
is the product of the same dynamic actual marginal variable cost as per the
e¢ cient structure hypothesis and the same square of the same elasticity. The
third formulation is that the same net e¤ect in the second formulation is ex-
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pressed by the sum of the e¤ects of the same increase in the Herndahl index
on the same e¢ ciency di¤erence of the GURP as per the e¢ cient structure
hypothesis, the same pricing error, and the same corrected dynamic actual
marginal variable cost, respectively, so it is the formulation that is used to
thoroughly interpret the quiet-life hypothesis with these e¤ects.
7.2 EGLI on the Cost Frontier
In terms of whether support for either or both of the hypotheses is desir-
able from the perspective of the EGLI on the cost frontier, the results of the
theoretical analysis herein suggest that both desirable and undesirable cases
exist, with the following two points being particularly noteworthy: 1) it is not
always possible to invoke support for the quiet life hypothesis to justify anti-
monopoly and anti-concentration policies; and 2) new industrial organization
policies are needed where support for the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is un-
desirable. Regarding the rst point, support for the quiet-life hypothesis can
decrease the EGLI on the cost frontier (i.e., increase the degree of competi-
tion on the cost frontier), so that support for this hypothesis does not always
justify anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies, even if an increase in
market concentration decreases dynamic cost e¢ ciency. Justication of such
policies is restricted to the case that an increase in market concentration
increases the EGLI on the cost frontier (i.e., decreases the degree of compe-
tition on the cost frontier), so enactment and enforcement of these policies
requires careful consideration. In terms of the second point, so far, there is
no theoretical foundation for suggesting that support for the e¢ cient struc-
ture hypothesis is undesirable. At least theoretically, there are, however,
both cases where support for the e¢ cient structure hypothesis decreases the
EGLI on the cost frontier (i.e., increases the degree of competition on the
cost frontier) and increases the EGLI on the cost frontier (i.e., decreases the
degree of competition on the cost frontier). Regarding the latter, it is judged
that support for the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is undesirable. In this case,
new industrial organization policies which di¤er from existing anti-monopoly
and anti-concentration policies, and under which e¢ ciency improvements in-
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crease the degree of competition on the cost frontier, are required.
7.3 Trends in Intertemporal Regular Linkages
Where intertemporal regular linkage of single-period EGLIs exists on the cost
frontier, the need for industrial organization policies must be judged from a
long-term perspective. As discussed, policy implications di¤er depending on
the direction and cause of this linkage, and as such, careful consideration
is required to determine when and why anti-monopoly/anti-concentration
policies and policies designed to increase long-term competition via improving
dynamic cost e¢ ciency or long-term growth are needed.
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